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I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A. Introduction 
The essential elements of the modern theory of international trade 
were originally formulated by the Swedish economist Eli Hecksher and 
further developed by his student Bertil Ohlin. Since its appearance in the 
early thirties, Hecksher Ohlin theory has received close scrutiny from many 
economists who have refined and extended the basic premise. However, for 
many years, no systematic analysis was made of the Impact of uncertainty on 
trade and specialization. The pioneering research in this area was 
initiated by Brainard and Cooper (1968). In a descriptive paper they 
explained why uncertainty (about trading prices) plays an important role in 
influencing economic behavior and how the pure theory of trade can be 
modified to take this uncertainty into account. Since then the literature 
on trade under uncertainty has become a growth industry and it is still an 
active field of research. 
In spite of the fact that uncertainty calls for financial markets 
that explicitly provide risk sharing opportunities, and such markets are 
indeed established in reality, none of the earlier models considered either 
local or international financial markets.^ It was Helpman and Razin 
^The only exception is Kemp & Liviatan who considered domestic Arrow 
Debreu contingent commodity markets. 
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(1978) who first felt the need to seriously integrate the theory of 
financial markets into the theory of international trade. In an economy 
with stock markets, they investigated the interaction between ex post 
trading in goods and ex ante trading in firm ownership shares and their 
implications for resource allocation. Since then, several economists have 
pursued this approach and slowly trade theory under uncertainty has become 
intertwined with finance theory. The positive and normative implications 
of Hecksher Ohlin trade theory have been reexamined in an uncertain world 
with international financial markets. 
The earlier models considered several sources of uncertainty. For 
instance, uncertainty in preferences or technology leading to uncertain 
terms of trade or uncertainty In terms of trade without reference to more 
basic causes were all examined. It was not until recently that it was 
recognized that one of the fundamental sources of uncertainty may be the 
government policy itself. Policy may or may not change and there are 
probability distributions attached to it. The current trend in research is 
explicitly modelling this uncertainty as opposed to older models which 
ignored it. More important, the new breed of models is considering the 
impact of rapidly growing financial markets on the effects of uncertain 
government policy. 
It turns out that these recent models can address policy issues more 
effectively. In a deterministic setting, to investigate the effects of 
exogenous change in government policy, the economist contrasts two 
alternative economies with different policies, the implicit assumption 
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being that it is possible to change policies. Such possibility, when 
recognized by the economic agents, creates a risk that may be termed as 
"policy risk." When the risk-averse individuals know that there is a 
possibility that a policy change will occur, they have incentives to insure 
the risks they face. The availability of financial markets explicitly 
provides risk sharing opportunities by permitting individuals to transfer 
resources over time as well as across states of nature. Consequently, 
opportunities to trade in these markets alter the responses of the economy 
to changes in government policies, if such a change occurs. In view of 
this, the, earlier models that ignore policy risks and/or the role of 
financial markets^ in mitigating these risks may give rise to 
inappropriate comparative static results. 
Pioneering research in this area has been undertaken by Alan 
Stockman (1986,1987,1988a,1988b,1988c). The primary focus of his research 
has been to investigate interesting policy issues in the area of 
international finance in the presence of financial markets. Only in one of 
the studies. Stockman and Delias (1986) provide example of a random tariff 
policy. Based on my literature review, it is the Stockman and Delias (S-D 
from now on) paper which first addressed the role of financial markets for 
trade policy under conditions of uncertainty. 
^It is important to emphasize here that the absence of financial 
markets (or their limited availability) does not eliminate the ability of 
economic agents to deal with risk completely. They switch over to 
alternative, imperfect ways of reallocating risk across states of nature. 
This is reflected in the composition of production, level of consumption 
and savings, level of labor supply than would have occurred in models that 
ignore policy uncertainty altogether. 
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In their model, it is the exogenous "political risk" which creates 
uncertainty about tariffs. Political risk, in turn, is thought to arise 
from uncertainty that results from the political process. Using a 
simplified two good, two country stochastic general equilibrium model where 
the agents trade in contingent commodity claims, S-D show that the 
relationship between consumption and import tariffs in their model differs 
radically from the relations predicted by standard trade models without 
political risk or asset markets. Instead of consuming more with a domestic 
import tariff that improves the terms of trade, a country consumes less in 
states of the world in which it imposes a tariff, and consumes more in 
states in which the other country imposes an import tariff. They attribute 
these counter intuitive results to the ability of households to insure 
against random government policy via asset markets. 
B. Objective of The Present Study 
The study of stochastic trade policy in conjunction with finance 
theory is an exciting and relatively new area of research. The neglect of 
financial markets in earlier trade models may have been justified on the 
ground that these markets were at their initial stages of development. 
However, due to the improved technology of communications and fewer 
government restrictions, financial markets have developed rapidly in the 
past decade, both in sophistication and scope. In view of the growing 
integration of international financial markets, we feel that it has become 
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essential to incorporate risk sharing opportunities explicitly as provided 
by these markets when analyzing effects of random government policy. 
The attempt made by S-D in this regard deserves considerable praise. 
We find the main theme of their paper interesting and thought provoking. 
However, the S-D type of framework raises more questions than it answers. 
We have made an attempt in the present study to pursue some of these issues 
with the help of our own theoretical framework. 
The first question that comes to mind concerns the role of tariff 
structure in a stochastic world with asset markets. How sensitive are S-D 
conclusions to the choice of export versus import tariffs? In the standard 
deterministic framework, such a distinction is irrelevant since both the 
export and import tariffs affect the domestic relative commodity prices in 
the same direction and by the same magnitude. This was first pointed out 
by Lerner (1936) and is commonly referred to as the Lerner symmetry theorem 
in the trade literature. We show in this study that Lerner's notion of 
equivalence between export and import tariffs does not necessarily extend 
to a stochastic framework with asset markets. 
Since Lerner's symmetry theorem is at the heart of many important 
results in trade theory, the non-equivalence of export and import tariffs 
in a stochastic framework is likely to give rise to important positive and 
normative implications. We examine some of these implications in the 
present study and find that S-D results are sensitive to the composition of 
tariffs. For example, S-D conclusions are completely reversed if an equal 
export tariff is used instead of an import tariff in their model, i.e., the 
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standard policy implications are retained in this case. Further, the 
optimal composition calls for both export and import tariffs, given some 
arbitrarily chosen effective protection (of any composition of export and 
import tariffs) sought by the domestic government and the foreign tariff 
vector. 
Since the welfare ranking of alternative policies has played a key 
role in furthering our understanding of commercial policy, it also seems 
appropriate to investigate the nature of optimal policy in a stochastic 
framework with asset markets. This, in turn, requires an extension of S-D 
type of framework to endogenize tariff policy by postulating the 
fundamental sources of uncertainty in government policy. We make 
endowments random and assume that tariffs are chosen optimally. We argue 
that the first best policy in such a setup calls for both export and import 
tariffs. Further, with the help of simulation results, we also demonstrate 
that the introduction of asset markets need not always be welfare 
improving, although there exists potential gains from trading in these 
markets. 
In our setup where private decisions are made in two stages due to the 
presence of spot markets (for instance, first financial decision and then 
consumption decision), the government may have an incentive to alter tariff 
level ex post once financial decisions are in place. Hence, time 
consistency issues are germane to our framework. We find that the 
financial structure plays an important role in determining the time 
consistent policy ex post. We also compare the time consistent tariff 
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policy with the precommitment tariff policy under alternative tariff 
structure in this study and present some preliminary results. 
The plan of this study is as follows. Since Arrow (1964) first laid 
out clearly the principles of optimality under uncertainty, we begin 
Chapter I by reviewing the Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity claims or 
financial claims markets. The related concept of completeness versus 
incompleteness of financial markets is also discussed. This is followed by 
a brief review of literature on trade models under conditions of 
uncertainty with asset markets. In chapter II, Stockman and Delias 
framework is formally introduced, since our study builds upon and extends 
such a framework. In Chapter III, we present our own theoretical framework 
and formally derive the condition under which Lerner's symmetry theorem 
will hold. The positive and normative implications of non-equivalence (of 
export and import tariffs) are also worked out. We relax the assumption of 
exogenous tariffs in Chapter IV and discuss the nature of optimal policy 
under alternative tariff structure and with or without asset markets. In 
Chapter V, the potential time consistency issues inherent in such a 
framework are addressed. We also compare precommitment and time-consistent 
tariff policies and present simulation results in support of our claims. 
In Chapter VI, we provide concluding remarks and suggest possible ways of 
extending the current research. 
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C. Arrow-Eebreu Contingent Claims Markets 
In his pathbreaking article, Arrow (1964) addressed the issue of 
optimal allocation of resources under uncertainty. His discussion was 
confined to a pure exchange economy though he admitted that adding a 
production side would not be difficult. His approach was elaborated later 
by Debreu who also considered production decisions explicitly. 
The novelty of Arrow's approach lay in introducing an ingenious 
device whereby commodities are distinguished not only by their physical 
characteristics, location and dates of their availability, but also by the 
state of nature in which they are consumed.^ In the literature such goods 
are referred to as state contingent commodities or simply contingent 
commodities. By virtue of this characterization, the list of commodities 
is greatly expanded compared to the corresponding case of certainty. What 
Arrow showed is that under certain conditions, this new definition of 
commodities allows one to obtain a theory of uncertainty free from any 
probability concept and formally identical with the theory of certainty. 
This is illustrated below with the help of an Arrow type pure exchange 
economy. 
Let us consider an economy which consists of H individuals. Let 
®We abstain from the discussion of the location at which delivery 
takes place and the date when delivery takes place so as to highlight the 
significance of state of nature. 
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there be N commodities and S states of nature. Suppose e|^(a) denotes 
individual h's endowment of good i in state a. Also let Ci'^(a) be her 
consumption of good i in state a, i.e., the amount of commodity i claimed 
by individual h if state a occurs. Then ch(a) represents her consumption 
vector such that 
c*(a) = [c^^a) Cv (a) ] 
Let individual h's tastes be represented by a utility function uf^ch(a)]. 
u^(.) is assumed to be a concave function exhibiting risk aversion. nh(a) 
is individual h's subjective probability assessment of state a. Then 
expected utility of individual h is written as 
c^(5)] = %]nA(*)uA[cA(a)] 
m  
Efficiency in consumption entails solving the following optimization 
problem: 
subject to 
WA[cA(l) c^(S)] = P; Vii = 2 H 
and 
^Ciia) ='^ej^(a) Vi=l...i\r; « = 1...3 
Solving this system, one gets Ci'^*(a) - c^^f W^'.Shei^Ca) ] . This is 
analogous to the certainty case. However the number of goods in this case 
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is SN instead of N in the certainty model. Moreover, the optimal 
allocation of resources reflects an ex ante Pareto optimum, since in this 
modified set up it is impossible to make someone better off in expected 
utility sense without making someone else worse off again in expected 
utility sense. 
What Arrow showed is that if there exists markets for claims on all 
contingent commodities ( i.e., SN number of markets in this example) and 
the same general caveats hold as under certainty; (i.e., no externality or 
no market power) then this optimal allocation of risk bearing can be 
achieved by a system of perfectly competitive markets in claims on 
commodities. This is illustrated below using the model described above. 
Let gi(at) be the unit price of a claim to good i to be delivered in 
state a. Then individual h's decision making problem is as follows: 
cA(l) . j T [cA(S) 
subject to 
Similar optimization problems faced by other individuals give rise to their 
respective consumption vectors. Finally, the goods market clearing 
condition is given by 
Çc/(o) =Çei'(o); Vi=l...W; a=1...5 
which in turn determines gi(a). Such a competitive system as postulated by 
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Arrow leads to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. 
However, it is unlikely in the real world that the individuals will 
precommit their endowments to consumption before uncertainty is resolved. 
Instead, the allocation of risk bearing is more often accomplished by 
trading in financial contracts and the real asset income is measured in 
units of the numeraire good. In Arrow's terminology, an "elementary" 
security of ot th type is a claim paying one unit of the numeraire good if 
state a occurs and nothing otherwise. There exists precisely as many 
securities as number of states of nature. Then any security may be 
regarded as a linear combination of the elementary types. 
The trade in financial contracts* takes place before uncertainty is 
resolved. Once a particular state of nature occurs, trade in commodities 
takes place. In such a framework. Arrow showed that the same optimal 
allocation of resources (as obtained under contingent commodity claims 
markets) can also be achieved via perfect competition on both the financial 
contracts and commodities markets. 
In contrast to the earlier case, individual h now faces a two stage 
decision making process. In line with dynamic programming, the second 
stage of the decision making process is usually considered first. Once 
state a is realized, individual h solves the following optimization 
problem: 
''In order to be consistent with the terminology used in the subsequent 
chapters, the term "financial contracts" is used instead of "securities" 




^ p ^ ( t t ) c p ( a )  s |ÇPi(a) 6^(0) + aA(a 
where A^(a) is the real asset income that accrues to individuals on trading 
financial contracts and Pi(a) is the spot price of commodity i in state a. 
The solution yields the indirect utility function as V'^ (a). 
Proceeding backwards, the individual h takes her financial decision 
in the first stage as follows. 
AMD ....^"(5) + p(*)eA(«)] 
subj ect to 
]^g(o)A^{a) s 0 
where q(a) denotes the price of an elementary financial contract a. As 
before, the equilibrium prices of commodities and financial contracts are 
then determined using the respective market clearing conditions. 
The crucial link between the contingent commodity claims models vis-a-
vis the financial contracts models is provided by the following relation: 
g ( a ) P i ( a )  = grj(o) 
An individual, confronted with these prices, has the same range of 
alternatives available in either case. In the contingent commodity claims 
markets, she can effectively acquire a unit of commodity i in state a by 
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paying giCoi). In the markets for financial contracts, she can effectively 
acquire a "claim" to a unit of commodity i in state a by paying q(a)pi(o). 
The social significance of the latter lies in the fact that it permits 
economizing on markets. Now there are only (N+S) markets instead of NS 
number of contingent markets earlier, 
A close examination reveals that the only way the two systems will 
enable individuals to consume the same bundle of contingent commodities is 
if their price expectations are correct under financial contracts; i.e., 
individuals can correctly foresee the structure of future spot prices of 
commodities. There is no obvious mechanism in Arrow's model which would 
guarantee so. So trading in financial contracts may not be sufficient in 
practice for Pareto optimality in the presence of uncertainty. This point 
was first raised by Radner (1970). 
Complete Versus Incomplete Financial Markets 
At this point it would be appropriate to introduce the concepts of 
complete versus incomplete financial markets. The market structure as 
envisaged by Arrow is said to be complete. In other words, if there exists 
markets for claims on all contingent commodities or there exists as many 
financial contracts as states of nature (and agents price expectations are 
correct), the resulting financial market structure is termed "complete." 
It is true that one may have a complete market system even if there are no 
Arrow type elementary contracts. What is important is to have sufficiently 
diverse contracts in adequate numbers so that by an appropriate combination 
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of them an investor is able to assure herself of a unit return in a 
particular state of nature and zero return in all other states of nature. 
As it turns out, this is possible if there exists as many contracts as 
states of nature with linearly independent payoff structure. From the 
above discussion it is apparent that an uncertain world with complete 
market structure is essentially analogous to an appropriate deterministic 
competitive world with redefined goods. Hence such an uncertain world is 
easy to model and the complete market structure is usually used as a useful 
benchmark case in many studies which explicitly incorporate risk sharing 
opportunities. 
Unfortunately, Arrow's world is an idealized environment. Despite 
the rapid growth of financial markets in recent years, such wide varieties 
of contracts as required for a complete financial structure rarely exist in 
reality. Due to informational difficulties related to "moral hazard" or 
"adverse selection" and/or various government restrictions prevailing in 
financial markets, some insurance market or other is usually missing. In 
view of this, optimality under uncertainty which presupposes a complete 
financial structure is intuitively less plausible. And when the financial 
structure is incomplete, the existing markets no longer reveal an objective 
price for every good in every state which can be conveniently used by all 
market participants to evaluate their consumption or production plans. 
Instead the risk prices become subjective and vary from one investor to 
another. In such a set up, the optimality principles of the standard 
deterministic world can no longer be retained. 
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To sum up, the complete market assumption is invoked for its 
analytical simplicity. But an incomplete market assumption describes the 
real world better. In the present study, we have used Arrow-Debreu type 
complete markets to model the financial structure. We feel that although 
such an assumption is unrealistic, even more so is the common assumption 
that there are no markets for contingent claims. 
D. Review of Literature 
Helpman and Razin (1978), for the first time, felt that it is only 
natural to consider trade theory under uncertainty in the presence of 
financial markets because of the risk sharing arrangements that they 
explicitly provide. In their book, they laid the groundwork by extending 
the standard trade models to a world of uncertainty where international 
risk-sharing is allowed to take place. 
In the Helpman and Razin model, uncertainty is generated by random 
production technology and reflected in random world prices. The random 
elements produce an incentive to develop financial markets. The only way 
the investors can spread risk in their model is by holding securities 
issued by the firms. Hence Helpman and Razin essentially had an 
"incomplete" financial market in their mind. Firms, which act in the 
interest of their shareholders, choose input levels by maximizing their net 
value on the stock market. The consumers face a two stage decision making 
process. In the first stage, before the resolution of uncertainty, they 
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choose their optimal portfolio by trading in the stock market. In the 
second stage, after uncertainty resolves, individuals use the proceeds from 
portfolios to purchase commodities. 
In this backdrop, Helpman and Razin reassessed the positive and 
normative implications of standard trade models once again. The main theme 
that emerges from their analysis is this: most of the propositions of 
standard deterministic trade theory do carry over to uncertain environments 
if international trade in securities is allowed. Their conclusions 
directly contradicted the predictions of earlier trade models (for example, 
see Batra, 1975) under uncertainty which did not take asset markets into 
account explicitly. As Helpman and Razin aptly pointed out, this could be 
due to the fact that these earlier models were "closed" from a very 
important aspect. Each country's production decisions were tied to its 
consumption decisions in the absence of financial markets. This is in 
direct contrast to standard trade theory under certainty, where given 
commodity prices, a country's production decisions are independent of its 
consumption decisions. 
Dumas (1980) explained that the only reason Helpman and Razin could 
extend the basic trade theorems to an uncertain environment is because of 
the restrictive nature of the production function that they assumed. 
Uncertainty is introduced into the production function through a random 
multiplicative term, known in the literature as "scalar" uncertainty. When 
the technology is of this form, output of the same commodity in different 
states is always produced in constant proportions regardless of the input 
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combination. The price of this composite good is state independent and 
defined as the weighted sum of individual state prices, weighted by the 
random multiplicative terms. The trade theorems are then easily verified 
with composite price playing the role of "certain" output price. In an 
alternative analysis, Dumas extended the trade theorems for the case of 
"generalized uncertainty" where the production function was fully random. 
However, the financial structure was assumed complete. In this backdrop, 
he concluded that the basic propositions can be easily extended to 
generalized technological uncertainty. 
In a recent paper, Grinols (1985a) has observed that just as "scalar 
uncertainty" is crucial to Helpman and Razin analysis (as aptly pointed out 
by Dumas), so is the assumption of complete financial markets to Dumas 
analysis. Both these assumptions are made for analytical simplifications. 
As it turns out, the models resulting from either assumption reduce to 
standard deterministic models of competitive equilibrium, with appropriate 
reinterpretation. In an alternative framework of incomplete market 
structure with generalized technological uncertainty, Grinols has 
reexamined the fate of the trade theorems once again. His analysis shows 
that whether the basic propositions of standard trade theory can be 
extended or not will depend on the extent of risk sharing opportunities 
available. 
Grinols (1985b) also put the theory of commercial policy in 
perspective by incorporating the risk sharing opportunities explicitly. In 
his view, commercial policy no longer operates solely through its effect on 
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prices and incomes; but also through its effect on foreign ownership income 
or through the use of monopoly power in risk markets. A traditional 
optimal tariff which achieves gains for a nation at the expenses of its 
trading partner may no longer be appropriate if the assets of that trading 
partner are partly owned by the domestic investors. The gains in current 
terms of trade improvements must then be weighed against the gains (losses) 
in foreign assets and policies must be reevaluated. Moreover, a small 
country in commodity markets may still gain from an optimal tariff on 
equity trade if it is large relative to the world financial markets. 
This, last issue has been pursued by Varian (1988) where he has derived 
a general formula for an optimal tariff and then applied it to the optimal 
taxation of internationally traded financial assets. It turns out that the 
size of the tax is directly proportional to the riskiness of the foreign 
assets and the degree of risk aversion of the exporting country. The more 
risk averse a country is, the more anxious it is to shift its risk and 
therefore the more susceptible it is to exploitation by the other country. 
However, the gains from exploitation rapidly diminish as the number of 
participants increases. 
In another very recent paper. Cole (1988) has studied the relationship 
between the structure of financial markets and the key macro variables in a 
simple general equilibrium model of trade. In particular, he has looked at 
the effects of changes in the degree of completeness of financial markets 
upon the variance and covariance of consumption, output and trade balance. 
The distinguishing feature of his model lies in using the utility 
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maximizing approach along with the representative agent paradigm. 
Uncertainty arises from a random technology and is of the multiplicative 
type. As financial markets become more complete, the agents are better 
able to diversify the risks associated with production shocks. Hence with 
an increasing degree of completeness, the variability of consumption 
decreases, the covariance between domestic and foreign consumption 
increases and the variability of output increases. As a result, the effect 
on the trade balance is ambiguous. In short, his results suggest that one 
way to obtain a measure of change in the completeness of international 
financial markets would be to examine how the variance - covariance 
structure of national output and consumption series were changing. 
E. Summary 
In short, we emphasize that the area of trade in conjunction with 
finance is appealing and thought provoking. Given the increasing openness 
of domestic financial markets and the expanding variety of financial assets 
being traded in recent years, trade modelling under uncertainty now 
explicitly requires modelling risk sharing using various structures of 
financial markets available. A decade ago Helpman & Razin felt that most 
of the positive and normative implications of standard trade theory would 
easily extend to a stochastic environment as long as international trade in 
securities is allowed. Later Grinols pointed out that the international 
trade in securities is not important per se other than that it equalizes 
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risk prices across countries. For that, what is needed is a complete 
financial market structure. The effect of varying degrees of completeness 
of international financial markets on key real variables has been analyzed 
in detail by Cole. In an attempt to explain the prevailing practice by 
many governments to discourage international portfolio diversification, 
Varian has invoked the optimal tariff formula and applied it to the 
taxation of foreign assets. Yet the impact of financial markets on trade 
theory and policy is a relatively unexplored area and there is scope for 
future research. 
One common feature of all these studies mentioned above is that 
uncertainty is generated by the production side. In none of these studies 
is explicit reference made to policy uncertainty. Yet a random government 
policy is as much a fact of reality as random technology or preferences. 
Governments may or may not impose tariffs and there are probability 
distributions attached to those actions. Hence we focus on policy 
uncertainty in the present study. Based on my literature review, only 
Stockman & Delias (1986) has analyzed the impact of random policy in the 
context of a general equilibrium trade model with "complete" financial 
markets. A detailed description of their framework is provided next. 
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II. STOCKMAN AND DELIAS FRAMEWORK 
Since the present study builds upon and extends the Stockman-Delias 
type of framework, we sketch out an outline of their model in this chapter. 
A. Stockman-Delias Model 
S-D model has two distinguishing features. One, it recognizes that 
one of the fundamental sources of uncertainty lies in the government policy 
itself. Policy may or may not change and there are probability 
distributions attached to it. Second and more important, it considers the 
impact of rapidly growing financial markets on the effects of government 
policy. As it turns out, the explicit consideration of financial markets 
may reverse the policy implications of traditional models. 
S-D examine the effects of changes in random but exogenous import 
tariffs on consumption levels ex post and hence realized utility levels. 
They perceive policy uncertainty to arise from the uncertain political 
process and hence term the risk associated with policy change as "political 
risk." The agents, in their model, trade in Arrow-Debreu contingent 
commodity claims to insure the policy risk they face. The main theme that 
emerges from their analysis is that in a world with asset markets, 
economists should not be surprised if the relationship between consumption 
and import tariffs differs from the predictions of standard trade theory 
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without asset markets. In their example with complete asset markets, a 
country consumes more in states in which it does not impose any import 
tariff and the foreign country does impose tariffs.^ 
Assumptions 
To demonstrate their results, S-D use a two country (both large), two 
good general equilibrium model. They call these goods X and Y. Some 
simplifying assumptions are made at the outset. It is an exchange economy. 
X and Y denote the endowments of these goods in the home country. 
Similarly X* and Y* denote the foreign endowment levels. The endowment 
levels are assumed state independent and symmetric with respect to each 
other, i.e., 
X = Y = X' •* = y 
where XT and Y^ represent the world endowment levels of good X and Y 
respectively. There is a representative consumer in each country and 
tastes are identical across countries. Hence trade occurs due to differing 
endowments. It is assumed that X > Y implying that the home country is 
always an exporter of X and importer of Y. 
The domestic country imposes an import tariff at the rate t, if at 
^In another section of their paper, S-D investigate the effects of 
changes in the probability that a tariff will be imposed. Their second 
conclusion (on which they do not put as much emphasis) is that a large 
country benefits, in expected utility sense, by a higher probability of 
domestic tariff and a lower probability of foreign tariff. This result 
emerges from their assumption that the probability is not itself viewed as 
a random variable by the agents. 
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all. Similarly, r* is the foreign import tariff rate, when imposed. They 
assume r - r*. To investigate the effects of possible changes in tariff 
policy, they consider four alternative outcomes of a one time change in the 
level of tariffs as indicated in the table below. 
Table 2.1 Four-state world in Stockman-De11as model 
States of Nature 
0 1 2 3 
Home 0 r 0 r 
Foreign 0 0 T T 
The probability of occurrence of each of these states is given 
exogenously. is the probability with which any state i occurs. It is 
assumed that » tt V i. Also the utility function is assumed such that 
U(x,y) - U(y,x) where lowercase x and y reflect the consumption level of 
these two goods in the home country. All these assumptions taken together 
imply that the domestic and foreign country behave symmetrically with 
respect to each other in states 1 and 2 and identically in states 0 and 3. 
In S-D model, the economic agents have access to complete financial 
markets where trading takes place in Arrow Debreu type contingent commodity 
claims. Payments for such claims are made only in state 0 in units of good 
X. The risk-averse, expected utility maximizing individuals participate in 
the financial markets to smooth income fluctuations across states of nature 
arising from a policy change, i.e., to "sell" increased income in good 
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states and to "buy" income in adverse states that offset losses in those 
states. The optimal portfolio allocation is obtained on solving the 
following optimization problem; 
Exact Optimization Problem 
The representative agent in the home country chooses the optimal 
consumption levels as follows; 
subject to 
3 _ _ _ 
'Vpi(x-Xi) + J) Qiiy-Vi) + (y-yj -T 5^ qiiy-vi) =o 
PO i"0,a i-1,3 i-1,3 
where p^ is the relative price of X in state i in the offshore market in 
terms of X in state 0; is the relative price of Y in state i in terras of 
X in state 0. 




y,Qi(y'-yi) + PiiX'-xî) + J) pj^(l+x) (X'-Xi) T 2 q^ÛÏ'-xl) = 0 
lîo 1-0,1 1-2,3 1-2,3 
The budget constraints need some explanation. The settlement of 
contingent commodity claims takes place in an off-shore market. When the 
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agents sell contingent claims and make delivery if a certain state occurs, 
they find it cheaper to deliver in terms of their export good. Similarly, 
when they buy contingent claims and receive delivery, they prefer bringing 
it in terms of their import good. Hence the first term on each budget 
constraint represents the state dependent payments that accrue to the 
typical agent in each country on selling contingent claims. The second and 
third term, on the other hand, denote the payments she makes by purchasing 
the claims. Furthermore, the final term in each budget equation indicates 
the tariff revenue which is rebated back to the people in each country in a 
lump-sum fashion. The bar indicates that the representative consumer takes 
this refund as given while choosing her portfolio. 
Finally, the spot relative prices are solved using the goods market 
equilibrium conditions as follows, 
X*' 1 X + X' = Xi xi Vi 
y 1 y * y* = yj yî Vi 
The symmetry assumptions about endowments, tariff levels and 
probabilities simplify the solution procedure to a great extent. In 
particular, these symmetry assumptions imply 
Qo " Po * 1; % = Pj; % = Pi! = P2 
*0 = yo = *0 = yÔi *3 = W; y, = *3* 
*1 = yi:  y I  = *2*; -^ 2 = yî:  y2 = xî 
From these symmetry conditions, it follows that there are only three 
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independent relative prices to solve for, namely pj.pz and p^. On solving 
the system of first order conditions, it turns out that the optimal 
portfolio investment radically alters the covariation of consumption and 
tariffs. A country consumes more in states of the world in which the other 
country imposes a tariff than in states in which it does. 
B. Stockman-Delias Results 
S-D illustrate their point with the example of a log utility function. 
The preferences of the home country agent are given by 
U(x,y) = ln(x) + ln(y) 
On solving the optimization problems as outlined above, the optimal home 
consumption levels ex post can be obtained as follows. 
^ X" .  _ . _ _ yv (IM 
*0 ~ *1 ~ "5" > Xj = = X (2+T) 
yv yw 
yo=y2 = \ - !  ^ 1 = ^ 3  =  1 2 % ^  
Comparing these consumption levels across states of nature, it can be seen 
that for this example, 
(Xj,ya) > (Xo.Vo) > 
where > denotes strict preference. 
From this result, S-D conclude that the domestic country is better off when 
the foreign country imposes an import tariff than with free trade. Also 
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the domestic country is better off with free trade than if it imposes a 
tariff. The term "better off" refers to the realized utility level since 
the ex ante consumption and utility are identical across countries in their 
model. 
The intuitive explanation of their results is simple. As explained in 
Chapter I, when the risk averse agents know that the government policy 
might change and they have the knowledge of the probability distribution 
function with which it will change, if at all, they alter their behavior to 
maximize utility subject to this uncertainty. Because the government 
policies frequently affect the domestic and foreign nationals differently, 
the possibility of a policy change creates risk that differs across 
countries. This, in turn, creates gains from trading on international 
financial markets. If these financial markets are complete, as they are in 
S-D model, then the income redistribution effect associated with a tariff 
policy change is eliminated. However, distortions introduced by tariffs 
cannot be eliminated. Substitution effect of a policy change continues to 
operate via changes in relative prices within and across states. For 
Instance, in state 1 when only the home country imposes tariff, 
substitution effect entails a domestic consumption distortion since the 
domestic price of the import good is artificially raised in that state 
compared to other states. Hence domestic consumers are worse off In this 
state. In contrast, if only foreign country imposes import tariff, as in 
state 2, the foreign price of their import good rises in that state. This, 
in turn, creates a pure substitution effect for the domestic agents in a 
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general equilibrium framework since the price of the home consumption of 
exports falls in the offshore market through secondary substitution effect. 
Thus, the domestic agents are better off in state 2. In general, the main 
point is that whenever a policy has important redistributive effects, its 
implications may be substantially altered by the ability of agents to 
insure against policy risks by trading on financial markets. 
Finally, S-D incorporate the production decision explicitly in the 
Appendix, Adding production in their model simply reinforces the results 
obtained earlier. This is because tariff now distorts production in 
addition to consumption in the country in which it is imposed while the 
income redistribution effect is eliminated as before. 
We conclude this chapter by noting that S-D study is indeed novel and 
deserves considerable credit. However, fascinating as this study is, it 
can be extended to examine some deeper issues which have already been 
outlined in Chapter I. We present our own theoretical framework next and 
analyze these issues in details. 
29 
III. EXOGENOUS TARIFFS: THE ROLE OF LERNER'S SYMMETRY THEOREM 
A. The Basic Model 
Assumptions 
A detailed description of our model is provided in this chapter. Some 
simplifying assumptions are made at the outset and listed below. 
1. We consider a two country, two good stochastic general equilibrium 
model. Let us denote the countries by home country and foreign country and 
the goods by C and F. 
2. It is an exchange economy. The production decisions are not 
explicitly taken into account. 
3. Both countries are policy active and can improve welfare through trade 
restrictions. We assume that they impose a combination of export and 
import tariffs. 
4. Each government's tariff policy is random and considered exogenous for 
the time being. This assumption will be relaxed later. In the absence of 
true uncertainty, the states of nature are synonymous with tariffs. 
5. There is a representative agent in each country such that aggregate 
behavior can be analyzed by looking at the representative agent's 
maximizing behavior. This is possible if preferences are identical and 
homothetic within each country. 
6. The preferences are also assumed identical across countries. Hence 
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trade can only occur due to differing endowments. We assume that 
endowments differ such that the home (foreign) country exports (imports) C 
and imports (exports) F in all the states. 
Notations 
Good C is chosen as the numeraire. Initially we assume S possible 
states of the world, each state corresponding to a different world tariff 
vector. TTi denotes the probability of occurrence of any state i. 
Let fg (fg) and 7s(7s)® be the rates at which import and export 
tariffs are imposed respectively by the home (foreign) government in any 
state s. We assume all tariffs are ad valorem and paid in kind. An import 
tariff of fg on F in the home country implies that for one unit of gross 
import of F, only (l-r,) units remain with the importer, while r, units go 
to the government. Similarly, if the home country imposes export tariffs 
at rate 7, on C, for each unit of gross exports, only (1-7,) units leave 
the country while 7, units are collected by the home government. 
®Barred terms pertain to the foreign country throughout. 
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Arbitrable Relations 
Assuming positive trade flows, arbitrage implies, 
BF pP 
pf = = 12 (3.1) 
(1-T,) (1-T,) (I-Y5) 
p/ = Pfii-yg) = P/{1-Ys) (3 2) 
where P ^ denotes the offshore (world) price of good i in state s. 
Combining (1) and (2), 
p, = ^ (3.3) 
^ (l-ils) (1-n,) (l-Tlfl) 
A 
where (Ps.Ps.Pa) denote the state s relative price of F and rig denotes the 
effective protection, in state s, of the combination of import and export 
tariffs.^ 
The Economic Environment 
We assume that spot markets exist. With the provision of spot 
trading, the representative agent in each country faces a two stage 
decision making process as explained in Chapter I. In the first stage, 
before uncertainty about government tariffs is resolved, she determines her 
optimal asset income by trading in financial contracts. At this stage, she 
is only interested in the asset income and not in its composition per se. 
Hence she is indifferent between trading in financial contracts on C, F or 
any combination of C and F as long as the net asset income (net of cost of 
and fia are defined such that (1-%,) - (1-Tg)*(1.7,) 
and (1-q,) - (l-fa)*(l-7,) Vs 
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acquiring these contracts) from any possible financial structure is the 
same.® In the second stage, after actual tariff levels are observed and 
spot market opens, she uses her asset income to purchase consumption goods 
without further risk bearing.® 
We assume that the home and foreign agents trade in contracts on good 
C. The settlement of such contracts takes place in an offshore market, 
outside the tariff boundaries of the two countries. This is because if 
financial contracts are settled in a policy active country, the government 
of that country is likely to alter tariff policy ex post after contracting 
decisions are made so as to extract as much resources as possible from the 
residents of the other country. Those residents, being aware of such a 
possibility, will never enter into such a contract. 
Each such contract entitles domestic individual h to a unit of C if 
and only if a certain state s occurs and it costs her g, units of good C in 
®It is implicitly assumed in this Chapter that government's tariff 
policy is irrevocably determined. As we will show in Chapter V, when a 
government has the discretionary power to alter tariff policy after 
financial decisions are made, the financial structure will play a critical 
role in determining tariff policy ex post. 
^Based upon our discussion of Arrow-Debreu contingent markets in 
Chapter I, as long as the agents can correctly foresee the structure of 
future spot prices, the same optimal allocation of risk bearing as obtained 
with contingent commodity claims can also be attained with ex ante trading 
in financial contracts and spot trading in consumption goods. Since we 
assume for now that tariff policies which are announced are actually 
pursued, the two structures remain equivalent. Hence, there is no real 
difference between S-D model and our model so far. Spot trading is 
emphasized in the present model because it is a commonplace in the real 
world and it will play a key role in analyzing time consistency issues 
later. 
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the offshore market in all states.Hence, 
= 1 (3.4) 
a 
Let denote the real asset Income, measured in units of C, which accrues 
to domestic individual h in any state s on purchasing (or selling) 
financial contracts. The asset budget constraint faced by the domestic 
agent h requires 
Ç M / ' O  (3 . 5 )  
i.e., asset income across states must add up to zero. The possibility of 
arbitrage profit from buying and selling financial contracts is ruled out. 
The asset budget constraint of the foreign agent can be similarly expressed 
as 
= 0 (3.6) 
Furthermore, the ex post trade balance equation in the presence of asset 
markets gets modified as 
(3.7) 
where X, and M, are defined to be the home net exports of C and home gross 
i°It is important to mention here that any other choice of numeraire, 
e.g., #1 " 1 is equivalent. In this case, payments for contracts are made 
only in state 1 in units of good C. This sort of payment mechanism is used 
in S-D model, as explained in Chapter II. Such a payment structure can be 
recovered from the present model through a linear combination of financial 
contracts, 
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imports of F respectively in state s and A, is the aggregate domestic asset 
income in that state. Since the earnings from asset trade are included in 
the service account in the balance of payment accounting, equation (3.7) 
implies that imbalances in merchandise trade and trade in services may 
occur, but they offset each other. 
As noted earlier, consumption goods are purchased once uncertainty is 
resolved and income is realized. Realized income in any state s consists 
of exogenous income and asset income. Exogenous income includes endowment 
income as well as the tariff revenue which is rebated back to the agents in 
a lump-sum fashion. Let and denote the exogenous and realized income 
of home agent h in any state s. By definition, 
Yg = Cg + PgFg *  TR (3.8) 
where TR is the exogenously given tariff revenue rebated back to household 
h and given by 
= (lly,) (3 8a) 
X ® ,  d e n o t i n g  p e r  c a p i t a  a g g r e g a t e  t r a d e  f l o w s .  U s i n g  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  
trade condition (3.7), 
X' " (3.8b) 
where A" is the per capita domestic asset income in state s. Moreover, 
J- = + (3.9) 
(l-Ya) 
The last term in income equation (3.9) deserves some explanation. It 
indicates that to settle a contract that calls for delivery or receipt of 
Ag units of C in the offshore market in state s, the domestic tariff 
structure magnifies the net income received (or paid) by the home agent. 
To be specific, if Ag<0, the home agent must provide, including tariff 
costs, [ As/(1-7s) ] units of C or [ AsPs/{ (l-7j,)pg) ] units of F (in C 
equivalent) to settle the contract. Given ps>p^8, it is cheaper for the 
domestic agent to settle the contract by exporting C. Similarly, if Ag>0, 
it will be more profitable to repatriate this income in terms of imports of 
F [- (Aa(l-rs))/p\ ], with a domestic value (in units of C) of 
[ (p.(l.f.)A.)/p. ] - [ A,/(1-7,) ]. 
By the same reasoning, the income equation of the foreign agent h can 
be expressed as 
xj" = {!--,) (3.10) 
It is worth pointing out here that the superficial difference between 
(3.9) and (3.10) arises because the domestic income is expressed in terms 
of its export good while the foreign income is expressed in terras of its 
import good. Substituting (3.8), (3.8a) and (3.8b) into (3.9), recalling 
arbitrage relation (3.3) and simplifying, 
Noting that - M%, M, - X, and Â, - -A%, income equation (3.10) of the 
foreign agent can be similarly simplified and expressed as follows: 
I a = Cj» + + J/" (1-7,) + (3.12) 
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B. The Exact Optimization Problem 
Asset Decision 
The representative agent in the home country chooses her optimal 
portfolio by solving the following optimization problem; 
subject to asset budget constraint (3.5) and income definition (3.11), 
where V(.) represents the indirect utility function of the home agent that 
exhibits risk aversion, i.e.. Vu < 0. 
Writing the resulting first order conditions for any two states s and j in 
ratio form yields 
where Vi(s) denotes marginal utility of income in state s. The 
interpretation of (3.13) is direct. Optimal risk allocation requires that 
the ratio of the marginal utility of income across states be equated to the 
ratio of effective contract prices on good C in those states weighted by 
the respective probabilities.^^ Since the effective domestic cost of 
^^The symmetry assumptions of S-D model imply that and 
export tariffs are not used in their model at all. Hence the optimal 
portfolio allocation rule (3.13) requires that marginal utility of income 
be equated across states. 
Max 
a/* 
Vii l j 'sPj)  
(3.13) 
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transferring income to state s is the optimal choice of assets is 
sensitive to the ratio of export tariffs between states. Solution to this 
optimization problem gives rise to the equilibrium asset demand vector of 
the representative agent h in terms of (n,#,p,7). 
The representative agent in the foreign country solves a similar 
optimization problem: 
Max 
subject to their asset budget constraint (3.6) and income equation (3.12) 
The corresponding first order conditions are given by 
This optimization problem yields the equilibrium asset demand vector of 
foreign agent h in any state s, for all s in terms of (n,0/p,r) vector. 
Finally, given all agents are alike, asset market equilibrium requires 
Ag *  Ag = 0 Vs (3.15) 
where A% and A* refer to the aggregate asset position in the home country 
and foreign country respectively. Given the representative agent 
assumption, the aggregate asset demand has the same functional form as the 




Given the asset position, the consumption decision is taken ex post by 
each agent on maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint. These 
consumption demands are embodied in the indirect utility function and 
recovered by invoking Roy's identity. Goods market equilibrium then 
requires 
Cg + CB = C, + CJ, = C/ Vs (3.16) 
f/ + f/ " Fg + Fg = FJ VS (3.17) 
where lowercase c^ (c*) and (f^) denote the home (foreign) aggregate 
consumption demand for C and F and C%(F%) refers to total world endowment 
of C (F). One of these two market clearing equations in any state s is 
made redundant by invoking Walras law and equilibrium spot relative prices 
are solved. 
Relation to Futures Contracts 
Before closing our discussion of the model description, it is worth 
exploring briefly the relation between the financial contracts used in our 
model and the futures contracts. The financial decision in our model could 
also have been formulated by having the representative agent in each 
country participate in futures markets. Instead we choose to use state 
contingent contracts in the present model because they imply a less 
restrictive payoff structure. 
Before investigating this issue in details, a few words about futures 
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contracts seem appropriate. Each unit of a futures contract on any good F, 
for example, entitles its buyer (seller) to receive (make) delivery of a 
unit of good F at a predetermined relative price in the future. Unlike 
with contingent financial contracts, the buyer of futures contracts is 
assured of a certain amount of good F regardless of the state of nature. 
The profit (or loss) from buying/selling futures contracts results from the 
discrepancy between the spot price and the contracted price. 
For a two state world, there is only one independent asset demand 
equation in the present model, given the asset budget constraint. Hence it 
is always possible to replicate the payoff pattern under contingent 
financial contracts with futures contracts by choosing their levels 
appropriately. However, for a more general S state world and (S-1) asset 
demand equations, it turns out that the futures contracts can replicate the 
payoff pattern of financial contracts only if the latter exhibit a linear 
payoff structure. A detailed exposition is provided in Appendix A below. 
C. The Role of Lemer's Symmetry Theorem 
Lerner's symmetry is at the heart of many important results in trade 
theory. Back in 1936, A.P. Lerner showed that an import tariff of say x% 
has exactly the same effects on resource allocation as an export tariff of 
x%. This is because trade policies affect resource allocation by altering 
relative prices of goods on domestic markets. These relative prices move 
in the same direction and by the same magnitude when an import tariff or an 
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equal export tariff is used. This becomes clear on examining the arbitrage 
relation (3.3) which indicates that it is only the effective protection 
r a t e  r i  t h a t  m a t t e r s  a n d  i t  c a n  b e  a t t a i n e d  b y  a n y  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  r  a n d  7 .  
Given the significant role that the symmetry theorem plays in 
analyzing the effects of commercial policy, Razin and Svensson (1983) first 
made an attempt to investigate whether Lerner's symmetry can be extended to 
a dynamic framework. Using a two good, two period model with 
homothetically separable preferences over time, they show that temporary 
import and export tariffs have differential effects on the current account. 
The introduction of a small import tariff, starting from a situation of 
free trade, improves the current account whereas the introduction of an 
export tariff worsens it. They cite the role of intertemporal substitution 
effect as the driving factor behind their results. Thus, the Lerner's 
symmetry breaks down for temporary tariffs. In contrast, both a permanent 
import tariff and a permanent export tariff have ambiguous effects on the 
current account. 
In a recent paper, Lopez and Panagariya (1990) have extended the Razin 
and Svensson framework by allowing for non-zero initial trade taxes and 
non-separable, non-homothetic preferences over time. In this setup, they 
have reexamined the direction of impact of temporary trade taxes on the 
current account. Their study suggests that the intertemporal 
substitutability/complementarity between current and future consumption 
plays an important role in determining the trade balance effects of import 
and export tariffs. In general, temporary tariffs or export subsidies have 
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ambiguous effects on the current account. 
Using our theoretical construct, we extend the Lerner's symmetry 
theorem to a stochastic framework instead. We show that Lerner's notion of 
equivalence between export and import tariffs need not extend to a 
stochastic framework with asset markets. In other words, it is not only 
the effective protection of the combination of export and import tariff 
that matters, but the composition of tariffs matters as well. Hence: 
Proposition 3.1: Lerner's symmetry between export and import tariffs 
prevails in a stochastic environment with asset markets if the ratio of 
export (or equivalently import) tariffs between states is the same across 
alternative policy regimes for each country, otherwise not. 
To prove this Proposition, consider two alternative policy scenarios 
for each country such that the effective protection rate %(%) for each 
state is the same across alternative scenarios, though the compositions of 
tariffs differ. Thus: 
(1-Y2) = (1-n,) Vs; R=I.II (3.18) 
(l-T?) d-y») = (l-ÏÏa) Va; R=I,I1 (3.19) 
where R indexes alternative policy regimes I and II. Then Lerner's 
symmetry holds if the following conditions are met. 




iilllL = Vs (3.21) 
(i-vf) (1-Y") 
Proof; see Appendix B. 
The intuitive explanation of this result is direct. In the standard 
deterministic framework, it is the relative price of a good within the 
state that guides resource allocation and this relative price remains the 
same across policy regimes as long as the effective protection rate is the 
same across these regimes. However, in a stochastic framework with asset 
markets, agents also respond to the changes in the price of a good across 
states by shifting consumption from one state to another via asset markets. 
How this price changes across states is sensitive to the composition of 
tariffs, even though the effective intra-state protection of any 
composition is the same. 
For instance, given prices (#,,Ps), an increase in 7^ (ceteris 
paribus) lowers the relative price of consumption of the export good C in 
state s as compared to the price of the same good in other states. Hence, 
ceteris paribus, domestic agents will shift consumption of C towards state 
s under regime I. Further, since the effective protection has not changed 
(i.e., decreases as 7^ increases), domestic agents will also substitute 
away from consumption of F in other states to consumption of F in state s. 
The preceding would be true for a small country and the only relevant 
effects would be the inter-state substitution. Naturally, the general 
equilibrium effects of any policy change would also depend on how the asset 
prices as well as relative goods prices will be altered in the offshore 
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market as consumption changes. In our symmetric framework, changes in 
given qi,; will have similar effects on foreign agents and will affect 
domestic agents through induced price effects. In contrast, an equivalent 
decrease in , matched by a corresponding increase in will 
encourage substitution away from state s to other states under regime II. 
Only in the special case where the ratio of export or equivalently import 
tariffs (given the effective protection rate) between any two states is the 
same across alternative policy regimes, the inter-state substitution 
effect will also be the same regardless of the composition of tariff 
policy. Thus, Lerner's symmetry will hold only in this special case. 
D. Implications of Non-equivalence 
Positive Implications 
The result of the preceding section has important positive 
implications. In this section we show that the counter-intuitive results 
obtained by S-D depend not only on the functional form they use, but also 
on the tariff structure they impose on the model. Using the same log 
utility function and making similar symmetry assumptions, we show that the 
ex post comparison of states yields ambiguous results when both export and 
import tariffs are used. Further, if only export tariffs are used, the S-D 
results are completely reversed and the standard policy implications are 
retained. 
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As in S-D, preferences of the representative agent in each country are 
given by: 
U{c,f) = In (c) + In (f> 
The corresponding indirect utility function is given by 
Using this functional form, home consumption demands in any state s are 
obtained as follows. 
Foreign consumption demands can be similarly derived. Following S-D, 
endowments of both the countries are considered state independent for now 
and symmetric with respect to each other, i.e,, 
Furthermore, €''• (or F^) is normalized to 1. Let us denote C (or F) by 
and hence C (or F) by (l-/i). 
To solve the model, it is convenient to start with the consumption 
decision first, given asset positions and then work backwards to the asset 
decision. Details of this solution technique are outlined in Appendix C. 
Following this procedure, the reduced form expressions for price and income 
in the home country can be expressed as below. 
V(I)p) = InJ - llnp; Vj>0, Vj^<0 (3.22) 
(3.23) 
c = F: C = F f ^ (3.24) 
_ [(1-7,) (1-Y,) + W 
' Do + (1-t,) (1-Y.) 
(3.25) 
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Pa = (P,/K,) (3.26) 
Ib = 2 1 + 
( 1 - T  ) (1-Y.) 
D„ 
-1 ( 3 . 2 7 )  
where by our construct, 
K, = (1-n,) (1-q,) (3.27a) 
D. = 
"i [ (l-jx) (1-Yi) + M (1-Tj) ] 
(3.27b) 
Substituting expressions for I, and p, into (3.23) and simplifying, 
c/ = 1 + (l-t,) (1-Y,) (3.28) 
= 1 + 
(1-Yf) 
From equations (3.28) and (3.29), it immediately follows that 
(3.29) 
Proposition 3.2: 
cf as (l-T,) (l-Y,) > (l-Tj) (1-Yj) 
fs < ff as (l-Y,) (1-T,) < (1-Yj) (1-Tj) 
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Proposition 3.2^^ suggests that the comparison of consumption levels 
ex post of each good across any two states s and j, in this simple case of 
a log utility function, depends only on the total tariff level imposed on 
that good in states s and j, given the whole vector of tariffs. The 
intuitive idea becomes clear at once when equations (3.1) and (3.2) are 
reexamined. Rewriting equation (3.1) for any other state j and then taking 
ratios, 
P/ZP/ (l-Yj) (1-T,) 
Pf/Pf " (1-Y.) (1-T.) 
it follows that if the ratio of the total tariff on F between states j and 
s exceeds 1, the cost of consumption of F is higher in state s relative to 
state j in the home country than in foreign country. Hence we would expect 
home (foreign) consumers to transfer consumption of F from s (j) to state j 
(s). Similarly, rewriting equation (3.2) in ratio form, 
pS/P^ _ (i-TJ (i-Y.) 
P//P/ (1-Tj) (1-Yj) 
it becomes evident that when the ratio of total tariff on C between states 
s and j exceeds one, the home (foreign) consumers will shift consumption of 
"Noting that c* (f*) - 1 . (f*) in our simplified setup, it can 
be easily seen that for the foreign country, 
c," \ cf as (1-T,) (l-Y,) < (i-T^) (l-Yj) 
F/ ^ If as (1-Y,) (1-T,) > (1-Y^) (l-tj) 
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C away from state s (j) to state j (s). 
Since the total tariff imposed on any good in any state depends on the 
actual tariff structure being implemented, from Proposition 3.2 it also 
follows that the ex post ranking of states in terms of consumption levels 
is highly sensitive to the composition of tariffs. To illustrate this 
point, let us extract the four state world of S-D from the existing setup 
by defining the states in the following manner. 
Table 3.1 Four-state world in the present study 
States of Nature 
0 1 2 3 
Home 0 1 0 n 
Foreign 0 0 1 rt 
From Proposition 3.2, the information in Table 3.1 is not sufficient to 
determine consumption patterns across states. To illustrate, consider the 
following cases : 
OassJL {S-D Example) : Y, = Y, = 0 Va; Xg = ri,; = q", 
Fzom Proposition^ .2i 
Hence, as in S-D, state 2, the one in which only the foreign country 
imposes tariffs, yields the largest realized home utility, whereas state 1, 
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where only the home country is policy active, yields the lowest realized 
home utility. 
Cage iii = ~« = o Vs; y, = tIs»' Yg = n. 
Assuming only export tariffs are used, Proposition 3.2 implies: 
c/=c/ > Co=C2! 
Consequently, under this tariff structure, state 1 yields the highest home 
utility, state 2 the lowest. Further, given home tariffs, the home country 
is always better off when the foreign country pursues free trade. Thus, 
the S-D results are reversed when export tariffs replace import tariffs. 
Cas6 iiii t, > 0 ; T, > 0 ; Ya > 0 < Ta > 0 V s 
We also assumées 
YO=Y2 = 0; YI=Y3' YO=YI = 0; Ya=Y3 
From Proposition 2, it then follows that 
Co" < c/t fa > f/; Co < Ci! fo > fi 
As it turns out, the comparison of realized utility between states 0 and 2 
depends on the relative magnitude of t and 7 whereas a similar comparison 
^^In general, given rj, it will be optimal to have 7  and 7  vary across 
all states. 
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between states 0 and 1 depends on the relative magnitude of r and 7 .  Thus, 
S-D results may or may not hold when import tariffs in their model are 
replaced by a combination of both import and export tariffs with the same 
effective intra-state protection. 
Apart from the specific comparison with S-D, the general point is that 
the equilibrium depends on the entire tariff structure. 
Comparative Static Effects 
The comparative static effects of a change in the export or import 
tariff in any state on the consumption levels can be obtained by 
differentiating consumption demands as given by (3,28) and (3.29) with 
respect to -y^: 
> 0,  ^< 0 V.,,, 
given > 0; 4^ < 0 Vs^k; -^2- < 0 Vs 
* Svjt avk ay*. 
As noted earlier, when increases, given prices, consumption of C 
becomes cheaper in state k compared to all other states and agents 
substitute away from consumption of C in the remaining states to state k. 
Further, the above results also indicate that the secondary substitution 
through induced price effects does not offset the initial impact of a 
tariff change. How the consumption of F in state k changes depends in turn 
on whether rj^. or is kept fixed. As explained earlier, when is held 
fixed, consumption of F also increases in state k relative to other states 
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or equivalently, there is no direct intra-state substitution effect. 
However, if is considered given, then an increase in also induces 
home agents to substitute consumption of C for F in that state. Finally, 
the effects of a change in 7ij on home consumption can be traced easily by 
noting that the increase in Yk affects the foreign agents in a similar 
manner and hence affects the domestic agents in an opposite manner through 
the induced price effect. Other comparative static results can be obtained 
in a similar fashion. Some of these results are given below. 
For example, for the foreign country; 
ffivenr\u, -^^>0; ^ f-<0W3*k 
implying that for the home country, 
^ % % % 
Similarly, 
givenT^, •^2-<OVs 
-» ^<0; ^>OVs#ic; ^ >OVs 
The effects of a change in or on home consumption can be analogously 
derived and expressed as follows. 
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Since consumption demands are sensitive to the choice of tariffs, the 
expected utility of the representative agent in any country is also 
sensitive to this composition. Given some arbitrarily chosen effective 
protection sought by any government, we would expect the optimal 
composition to Include both export and import tariffs. This is 
demonstrated below using the four state world (defined in Table 3.1 above) 
as an illustrative case. 
Assuming that the domestic government acts in the national interest, 
announces tariff policy before uncertainty is resolved and commits to it, 
the constrained optimal export tariff ( constrained by the choice of level 
of 7) can be obtained on solving the following optimization problem: 
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^^^EVilsp) = g îiiV^I^îPi) 
subject to 
(1-Y) (1-T) = (1-tl) 
where the level of r\ is arbitrarily chosen and r) and y are considered 
given, and we assume as before in case iii, to - f2 " 7i ~ 73- Rewriting 
the equilibrium consumption bundles (3.28) and (3.29) for the four state 
case in terms of rj and 7, the expected value of the corresponding indirect 
utility function is given by 
1 + (1 -Y ) / n 1 -tl ) )]1 + ( 1-TÎ) /[ ( 1 -Y ) I?o] 1 












! « = 7ïo+«i + (1-Y) 
Assuming rcj. - (1/4) for simplicity, the optimal export tariff is then 
obtained on solving the following first order condition: 
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dEV(f) _ _ 
ÔY 
(1-ÏÏ) 
l*Do (l-q)+(l-Y)D, 1+(1-Y)Z?, 
2nD„ 
2nZ?o(l-HTi) 





(l-Y)+Do (l-y) + {l-y\) Dg {l-Ti) (1-y) + {1-y) Dg 
2nD„ 
M 
Clearly, equation (3.31) is non linear in y and an analytical solution is 
hard to find. However, even without actually solving for y, we can 
evaluate the expression in (3.31) at y locally around zero and y locally 
around rj. On simplification, it turns out that 
m <0 
^  i y - O  ^  Iy"H 
Hence Proposition 3.3 follows. 
Proposition 3.3; Given the foreign tariff vector and the home country's 
effective protection, home country's expected welfare is maximized when 
both export and import tariffs are used.^'' 
E. Extension to Production Economy 
In this section, we extend our general theoretical construct to 
incorporate production decisions explicitly and show that the composition 
of tariffs would generally matter for production decisions as well. To 
keep our exposition simple, we consider a partial equilibrium setup and 
^''This result is also confirmed by solving (3.31) for y* using 
numerical methods where ît^ is no longer assumed to be the same across 
states. 
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analyze the effects of a random tariff policy pursued by the home 
government on the domestic production decision. 
The domestic production possibility frontier is given by 
£>e = 3(Qt) ! 9'(Qt) <0 (3.32) 
where Qf and Qj. denote the quantities produced of good F and C 
respectively. The income equation of representative agent h can be 
rewritten as 
With the possibilities of production, the sequence of decision making gets 
modified such that production decision is taken along with asset decision 
before uncertainty is resolved. 
The representative agent in the home country now solves the following 
optimization problem: 
subject to asset budget constraint (3.5) where the income equation is given 
Ib = + P^FB + 9{Qt) + PbOI + TR, + A^/ (l-y.) (3.33) 
Max 
van : Pi) As; ci* 
by (3.33). 
The corresponding first order conditions yield 
*8. (3.34) 
i^lf production decisions are taken after uncertainty is resolved, 
this is analogous to having a random endowment model and nothing 
substantive changes. 
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Ç itiV>(l) [sr'(0/) +Pi3 = 0 (3.35) 
where a denotes the Lagrange multiplier. 
Substituting (3.34) into (3.35) and rearranging, the optimal production 
rule is obtained as follows. 
MRT m I I = (3.36) 
Equation (3.36) clearly indicates that the optimal allocation of resources 
is sensitive to the choice of export (or equivalently import) tariffs, 
unless 7 is invariant across states. Intuitively speaking, the 
representative agent chooses the optimal production level of F under 
uncertainty by equating the marginal cost of producing F to the weighted 
average of spot relative price of F. In the presence of financial markets, 
the weight attached to any state i is essentially the effective cost of 
transferring income to that state. Ex post, the representative agent finds 
herself overproducing in some state and incurring losses while 
underproducing in some other state and earning excess profits. The 
availability of financial markets, however, enables her to smooth her 
income and consumption across states if optimal production rule (3.36) is 
followed. 
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Comparative Static Effect 
The effect of a change in -y, on domestic production can be obtained by 
differentiating (3.36) with respect to -y,, noting that the commodity prices 
and contract prices are considered given in this partial equilibrium setup. 
This, in turn, yields 
= 3ign[]^'{Q^)\ -p,] 
implying 
^ ; 0 as MRT^p, (3.37) 
This is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. In this figure, 
the curve labelled "hdabe" depicts the domestic production possibility 
frontier. There are two possible states of nature. States 0 and 1 are 
defined as in Table 3.1 above. The optimal production rule (3.36) requires 
that the domestic agent produces at point a. If state 0 occurs, she 
overproduces by the amount (Qfa"Qfo)- Similarly, if state 1 Is realized, 
she underproduces by the amount (Qfi-Qfa) • If 7i is lowered, she increases 
her production of F from Qg, by withdrawing resources from the production 
of good C. Alternatively, if -yo is lowered, she produces less than 
In search for an intuitive explanation of this result, let us rewrite 
equation (3.36) as 




Figure 3.1 The effect of a tariff change on production decision 
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Then 7^ can be interpreted as the weight given to the change in income from 
the production of an additional unit of F in any state i. The lower is 7^, 
the higher is this weight. Thus, if excess profit is made on the margin in 
state i from an additional unit of F, more of F will be produced as 7^ is 
reduced. Similarly, less of F will be produced if a loss is incurred on 
the margin, with a reduction of 7^. 
This concludes our discussion of the effects of exogenous tariffs in a 
stochastic world with asset markets. To sum up, the main theme of this 
Chapter is that Lerner's notion of equivalence between export and import 
tariffs does not extend to a stochastic framework with asset markets unless 
the ratio of export (or equivalently) import tariffs between states is the 
same for alternative tariff structure. This result, in turn, has important 
positive and normative implications. We relax the assumption of exogenous 
tariffs next and examine the nature of optimal policy. 
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IV. ENDOGENOUS TARIFFS: NATURE OF OPTIMAL POLICY 
A. The Economic Environment 
In the analysis thus far, the tariff policy was treated as exogenous. 
Hence the randomness in government policy was considered ad hoc in nature. 
In this chapter, we endogenize tariff policy so as to discuss and compare 
the nature of optimal policy in a stochastic environment with or without 
asset markets and under alternative tariff structures. We assume that the 
randomness in tariff policy arises from true uncertainty about the state of 
nature and is reflected in random endowments. This can be justified by 
noting that quite often in the real world the tariff levels are tied to the 
volume of exports or imports which, in turn, depend on the endowment levels 
(or the production as the case may be) of the export or import goods. 
Further, we assume that the government acts in the (national) public 
interest and chooses the optimal levels of tariffs so as to maximize the 
domestic welfare.^® 
^®In other words, we use "optimal tariff type argument" in the present 
study to Justify the imposition of tariffs. An alternative approach would 
be to incorporate "public choice" considerations and focus on the private 
interests and incentives of the individuals who make up a government. In 
that case, the randomness in government policy may arise from the 
uncertainty about the political process itself as suggested by S-D. 
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Assumptions 
Some of the assumptions made earlier are modified. 
1. To keep things simple, we consider a special case where only the home 
country is policy active. 
2. The same log utility function is used to indicate preferences but the 
symmetry assumptions about endowment are no longer maintained. 
3. The world endowment levels of C and F are no longer normalized to 1. 
Policy Regimes 
We discuss the nature of optimal intervention in such a setup with 
three alternative policy regimes. Under regime I. the government uses 
import tariffs only and asset markets are assumed absent. In the absence 
of asset markets, the tariff structure does not matter and hence import 
tariffs are equivalent to the effective protection rate. This regime is 
chosen to highlight the role of asset markets. When there is scope for 
inter state trade, the introduction of asset markets is likely to be 
welfare improving, especially if appropriate trade policies are used. 
Under regime II. the home government once again uses only import tariffs, 
but this time asset markets are present. This regime is selected to 
replicate the S-D case. Finally, repime III depicts our case where the 
home government uses a combination of export and import tariffs with asset 
markets present. As demonstrated in the previous Chapter, regime II 
constitutes a special case of regime III and is obtained on setting the 
export tariff vector to zero in regime III. 
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Sequence of Decision Maklnp 
Irrespective of the policy regime, decision making takes place in the 
following sequence: 
(i) The home government announces its optimal state contingent tariff 
policy^^ and commits to it^® , given the expectations about future 
endowment levels ; 
(ii) the representative agent in each country takes asset decisions under 
regimes II and III based on the announced policy; 
(iii) uncertainty is resolved and actual endowment levels and their prices 
are observed; 
(iv) consumption decisions are made, given asset positions and 
(predetermined) tariff levels. 
It is worth noting here that although time does not enter explicitly 
in our model, it does so implicitly since the ordering in which decisions 
are made is important. 
^'Although state contingent tariffs constitute the first best policy 
in a world of uncertainty, they may not be feasible in practice due to the 
lack of information or flexibility on part of the government. 
^®In a setup where private decisions take place in two stages (for 
instance, financial and/or production and then consumption decision), the 
government may find it beneficial to alter the tariff level ex post once 
financial (and/or production) decisions are made and uncertainty is 
resolved. This, in turn, will give rise to time consistency issues which 
are discussed in Chapter V. In this Chapter, we abstain from these issues 
by assuming that policies that are announced are also pursued. 
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B. Solution Method 
To solve, the backward optimization technique is used as outlined in 
Appendix C. On combining steps (ii) through (iv), the reduced form income 
and price equations are obtained as functions of endowment levels as well 
as policy parameters. Optimal policy instruments are then determined by 
maximizing the expected value of the indirect utility function of the home 
agent, given the income and price equations. The optimal tariff policy 
under each of these regimes is derived below. 
Regime I 
Following the method suggested above, the reduced form income and 
price equations of the home country in the absence of asset markets are 








where and ^9^ denote the home shares of the export and import good 
respectively in their world endowment and can be expressed as 
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Substituting (4.1) and (4.2) into (3.22), we get 
V(s) = -lln (C/F/) + ln(a,+p.) 
:ln 2( i -n , )  
(1-P,) 
(4.3) 
Optimal r) is then determined on maximizing the expected value of (4.3), in 
terms of (a,/9) as given below. 
(1-11,) = (4.4) (1-p,) (1+*,) 
Equation (4.4) indicates that the comparison of the optimal import tariff 
across states under regime I depends on the home shares of both exportable 
and importable. Finally, substituting (4.4) into the expected value of 
V(s) in (4.3) and simplifying. 
EV^ = Ç-|7t^ln(c/F/) + Ç7r_,ln(aj + p^) + ln(2) 
- Ç -^n^lnd+Pj) - Çn^lnd+Xi"^) ' 
(4.5) 
where 
r, = (1-Pi) (4.5a) 
(1+Pj) (l+«j) 
Equation (4.5) represents the maximum expected welfare that can be attained 
^®In the absence of asset markets, any cross state effect resulting 
from the imposition of a tariff is absent. Hence the first order 
conditions which determine (rji »7g) are all separable and can be 
solved analytically. 
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under regime I. 
Regimes II and III 
On simplification, the reduced form income and price equations in the 
presence of asset markets can be expressed as follows. 
2CIn 
n  +  i r d - y . )  
(4.6) 
Ps = 
w + a 
(I-Y5) 





Substituting (4.6) and (4.7) into (3.22) as before, the indirect utility 
function can be rewritten as 
v ( 3 )  = •|ln(c/F/) +ln 
a(l-Y,) 
llnl m ( i -n . )  
+ln(2) -'I'ln [iV+iî(1-Yj) ] 
(4.8) 
Optimal (q,T) are obtained on maximizing the expected value of V.^" The 
resulting first order conditions, on simplification, yield 
^"Given effective protection as defined in footnote 7 above, this is 
equivalent to choosing the optimal export and import tariff vector. 
es 
#!| . 0 1 = (l-p,)Ao Va (4.9) 
dEV\ _ 0 ^ (1-Y,)= + (1-Y,) = 
av. ^  w(i-n,)+a(i-Y.) w+J?(i-Y.) 
= A^(l-a,) + (l-p,)(l-n,)] Va 
(4.10) 
where 
1 + 1 
W(l-nj)+a(l-Yj) N+RU-yj) 
(4.10a) 
The optimal policy instruments under regime III (denoted by are 
obtained on solving the system of equations embodied in (4.9) and (4.10) 
simultaneously while the optimal instruments under regime II (denoted by 
fii) are obtained on solving only the set of equations embodied in (4.9), 
having set 7 to zero. Further, recalling from Chapter III that it is only 
the relative (across state) export tariffs that matter for asset decisions, 
we can arbitrarily set (I-70) to 1. However, due to the non linear nature 
of (4.9) and (4.10), analytical expressions for optimal instruments are 
hard to find. 
Even without solving the set of equations embodied in (4.9), it is 
possible to make some observations regarding the nature of the optimal 
import tariff solution. A closer inspection of equation (4.7a) reveals 
that the expression denoted by R depends on the mean value of a, (say a®) 
and the distribution of ^  and rj when export tariffs are not used. The 
expression N always depends on the mean values of a and j3, a® and , 
regardless of the policy regime. This, in turn, implies that the 
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expression hg in (4.10a) depends on a®, as well as the distributions of 
/9 and r? under regime II. Thus, the optimal solution of f;, under regime II, 
as given by equation (4.9), will also depend on a®, y9®, and the 
distribution of p. For any given distribution of /9, the optimal import 
tariff in any state s will be the same across different combinations of 
endowment shares, regardless of the distribution of home share in the world 
endowment of its exportable, provided its mean share in exportable is the 
same across these cases. It is worth noting however that this feature of 
the optimal import solution is sensitive to the simple log utility function 
used and need not generalize to any other functional form. 
C. Comparison Across States 
A closer inspection of (4.9) and (4.10) also reveals that although an 
analytic solution is not feasible, one can still compare the relative 
values of the optimal instruments across states. For instance, using (4.9) 
for any two states, k and it can be verified that the relative value 
of import tariffs between states s and k depends only on the relative 
magnitude of the s in those two states. This is because the whole 
endowment vector influences the optimal choice of r in any state in a 
symmetric fashion, as they are embodied in N and R. Hence: 
^^Noting that (1-r,) - (l.q,)/(l-^,) 
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Proposition 4.1: Under either regime II (where only import tariffs may be 
used) or regime III (where both import and export tariffs are used); 
x'k  ^ as P*. ^  p, Vstk 
In words, in the presence of asset markets, the optimal import tariff 
(under either regime II or III) in any state k is smaller (larger) than 
that in state s as the home country's share of the total world endowment of 
its importable good is larger (smaller) in state k than in state s. This 
contrasts with the earlier rule (under regime I) obtained in the absence of 
asset markets, where the shares of both import and export goods influence 
the relative values of optimal import tariffs across states. 
To compare the relative values of export tariffs under regime III, we 
substitute (4.9) into (4.10) and simplify further. Then (4.10) can be 
rewritten as 
dEV 0 — r = A. (!-«_) Vs (4.11) 
As before, this implies that the comparison of the optimal export tariff 
across states depends only on the home country's share in the world 
endowment of its exportable good in those states and does not directly 
depend upon its share of the other good, although the complete solution 
involves shares of each good in all the states, as embodied in N and R. 
Hence ; 
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Proposition 4.2: Under regime III (where both export and import tariffs 
are used); 
Yjc < as ttfc ^ <%. Vsfk 
Furthermore, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, taken together, indicate that the 
comparison of the effective protection r} across states under regime III 
depends upon the endowment shares of both exportable and importable in 
those states, as under regime I. 
The intuitive explanation for Proposition 4.1 or 4.2 lies in the fact 
that a rise in the import or export tariff also hurts the home country by 
reducing the volume of trade. The higher is the home share of the 
importable (exportable) in state k relative to state s, the lower (higher) 
is the volume of trade in the importable (exportable) good in state k than 
in state s. Hence we would expect the home government to impose a lower 
(higher) import (export) tariff in state k than in state 
^^Although we have not considered a regime where the home government 
uses export tariff only in the presence of asset markets, the preceding 
discussion suggests that such a regime would represent a mirror image of 
regime II. The expression for R in (4.7a) will depend on the distribution 
of a and 7 as well as the mean import share, /9®. Substituting (4.7a), into 
(4.10a), ho, in turn, will depend on the mean shares in importable and 
exportable as well as the distribution of a and 7. Finally, on 
substituting into (4.7a) and (4.10a) into equation (4.11), the optimal 
value of export tariff in any state s will be expressed in terms of 13° and 
the distribution of a. 
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D. Comparison Across Regimes 
In addition to comparing the optimal values of export or import 
tariffs across states under any regime, we also compare the optimal 
policies across regimes in this section. This, in turn, enables us to 
comment on the nature of the first best policy in our model as well as the 
role of asset markets. 
The First Best Policy 
Welfare comparisons across different regimes are not simple, since the 
optimal policies under regimes II and III cannot, in general, be solved 
analytically. However, even without actually solving for optimal tariffs 
under these regimes, we can argue that the home country's expected welfare 
under regime III must be at least as high as that under regime I or regime 
II. This is because by properly choosing the additional instrument 7 
under regime III, it is always possible to reduce asset trade in this 
regime to a level such that it results in a solution equivalent to regime I 
or regime II. Hence regime III constitutes the first best policy in our 
stochastic framework with asset markets. 
The intuitive idea underlying this claim becomes clear when one takes 
into account the fact that in a stochastic world, goods are redefined to 
incorporate the state of nature in which they are made available. Hence in 
a world of two goods and S possible states, there are, in fact, 2S goods 
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and (2S-1) relative prices. The corresponding first best policy calls for 
(2S-1) instruments. In addition to S import tariffs as in S-D model, extra 
instruments are needed to tax asset trade and are provided by export 
tariffs in the present model. In the absence of export tariffs, the 
existing import tariffs are used as imperfect substitutes to capture market 
power in asset markets and hence the associated welfare level is lower 
under regime II. 
The Role of Asset Taxes 
One may wonder why export taxes are used in the present model to tax 
asset trade. This can be attributed to the particular choice of the 
numeraire good In the present model. Since good C is used as the numeraire 
which, by our assumption, is the export good for the home country, taxing 
the real asset income (measured in units of C) is analogous to taxing the 
export good in our model. 
An alternative characterization of the present model may proceed by 
allowing the home government to tax the asset income accruing to the home 
agents directly before uncertainty is resolved. Once uncertainty is 
realized, the government can choose either an import or an export tariff to 
influence the consumption decision of the home agents, given that the 
composition of tariffs does not matter ex post. 
71 
Ranking of Second Best Policies 
Comparison of regimes I and II, in view of the above discussion, 
involves ranking two second best policies and nothing conclusive can be 
said. Regime I depicts a second best world because it is constrained by 
the absence of asset markets, although there remains potential gain from 
trading in these markets. In contrast, adequate policy instruments are not 
used under regime II with asset markets and this results in a second best 
world once again. In particular, it is no longer possible to replicate the 
regime I solution with regime II and it is conceivable that if only import 
tariffs are used, then expected welfare under regime II with asset markets 
can be lower than that under regime I without asset markets. Hence: 
Proposition 4.3: If only import tariffs are used, the addition of asset 
markets may lower the expected utility of the policy active country. 
Since an analytical solution for regime II is not feasible in general, 
we prove Proposition 4.3 by an example, Let us impose some structure on 
regime II by assuming that the home country's share in the world endowment 
of F is constant across states (i.e., ^ V k). From Proposition 4.1 , 
it then follows that 
(l-Tljt) • (1-T*) = (l-q) Vk 
The first order condition used to solve optimal policies under regime II 
(given by 4.9) then consists of only one equation and can be solved 
analytically using the definitions of N, R and hg from equations (4.7a) and 
(4.10a) respectively. This Implies 
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0» =  (4.12) 
If (Xi is also constant across states, this naturally reduces to the same 
solution as for regime I under this special case. Otherwise, the maximum 
expected welfare with regime II is obtained on substituting (4.12) into the 
expected value of (4.8) as follows. 
Recalling equation (4.5), the maximum welfare attainable under regime I, 
and comparing with (4.13), we find that the difference in expected utility 
across regimes I and II hinges upon the order in which expectations are 
taken, i.e., 
- G[2(a)] 
EV" = Ç-|niln(c/f'/) + ln(*« + p) + ln(2) 
- -|ln(l+P) - ln(l+r* = ) - -iln(l+o®) 
(4.13) 
where 
J., _ [(!-«') (1-0)] 
[(!+*") (1+P)] (4.13a) 
where 
(4.14) 
and r^ is defined in (4.5a) above. 
Applying Jensen's inequality, it then follows that 
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E[V^\ ^ FÎ[V"] as G„ ^  0 
where the double subscript denotes the second derivative of G with respect 
to a. Differentiating (4.14) twice,, it can be verified that G„a, depends on 
the parametric values of and 0 and cannot be signed in general. Case 
(3) in Table 4.1 below provides a specific example where the expected 
utility is higher under regime I than regime II and in this case, the 
addition of asset markets indeed lowers expected utility. 
E. Simulation Results 
Failing to obtain analytical solutions for regimes II and III, we 
present some simulation results in this section. We consider four 
different combinations of the home country's share of exportable and 
importable in a two state world (defined by state 0 and state 1) and 
compare expected welfare across all three policy regimes. In regime III, 
7o is set equal to zero without loss of generality, as explained earlier. 
In the first case, a's and s are assumed constant across states and as a 
result, there is no potential gain from asset trade. This example is used 
as a useful benchmark case. In the second case, a's are assumed invariant 
between states while s are not. Hence asset trade occurs due to the 
difference in the home share of the importable across states. In contrast, 
)9's are assumed constant across states in the third case while a's vary. 
Thus, trade occurs due to the difference in the home country's share in the 
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total world endowment of the exportable across states in this case. 
Finally, the last case considers a more general scenario where both a and ^  
vary across states. 
a and /9 always lie between 0 and 1. Further, a and /0 being the home 
shares in the exportable and importable respectively, it follows that a>/3. 
We construct the four cases by choosing a and ^  such that at® - 0.8 and yS® -
0.3.always, regardless of the distribution of a and )3. 
The non-linear equations are solved using an Iterative technique. We 
start with an initial guess value of the root and then improve upon it 
using the Newton-Raphson formula. The algorithm is written in Fortran. A 
detailed description of the Newton method is provided in Appendix D. 
The simulation results are presented in Table 4.1 below. A close 
inspection of these results reveals the following features. 
1. The expected welfare level under regime III is always at least as high 
as that under regime I or regime II regardless of endowment shares, as was 
expected. 
2. The first case also demonstrates that in the absence of any scope for 
inter-state trade, the asset market has no role to play. Hence it is not 
surprising that the optimal levels of policies and the associated welfare 
levels are the same with or without asset markets in this case. 
3. Comparison of regimes I and II also confirms that the introduction of 
asset markets need not always be welfare improving, when adequate 
instruments are not used, although there is scope for inter state trade. 
In particular, when export tariffs are not used (Regime II), the 
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Table 4.1 Comparison of precomraitment solutions across policy regimes 
Case «0 «1 yflo Policy I Policy II Policy III 
(1) 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 Vo°?r"0.5457 rjg-fji-0.5457 
r-o=Ti=r;o=r/i 




EV* = 1.8613 
(2) 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 - 0.6315 ro-r;o-0.6167 
fji — 0.4226 T^—f;i-"0.4327 
EV* - 1.8495 EV* - 1.8684 
To-fjo-0.6167 
0.4327 
7 o - 7 i - 0 . 0  
EV* - 1.8684 
(3) 0.62 0.98 0.3 0.3 rjo - 0.3400 Tg-rjo-O . 5457 
fji - 0.8630 r^-fy^-0.5457 
EV" 1.8814 EV* - 1.8613 
jjo - 0.3244 
- 0.8721 
roTi"0. 3244 
7i - 0.8108 
EV* - 1.9183 
(4) 0.62 0.98 0.1 0.5 »7o - 0.4646 
rji - 0.8259 
T"o-r7o"0.6167 
Ti-f/i—0.4327 
EV* - 1.8152 EV* - 1.8684 
r g — . 4 2 8 9  
— 0.8406 
- 0.8105 
Ti - 0.1588 
EV* - 1,9251 
NOTES: This simulation assumes C''o-6 ,G^i-8,F^o-4,F^i-5,tTq-tti-O.5. 
EV* refers to the maximum expected utility under each regime. 
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introduction of asset markets is most likely to reduce welfare when there 
is significant variation in a (share of exportable), but p is constant 
across states (case 3). 
4. It is also interesting to note that in the second case, expected 
utility is always the same with asset markets, even when adequate policy 
instruments are not used. Since the home country's share of the exportable 
is the same across states in this case, from Proposition 4.2 it follows 
that 7i - 7o • 0. Therefore, although additional instruments are 
available, they are never used. 
5, When only import tariffs are used, their optimal levels and the 
associated welfare levels are the same between cases (1) and (3) or between 
cases (2) and (4). This is due to the fact that the optimal import 
tariffs, under regime II, depend on the distribution of the home country's 
share of importable and the mean share of exportable, as explained earlier. 
These conclusions are likely to be retained regardless of the world 
endowment levels or the probability distribution vector since any 
comparison of expected welfare across regimes primarily depends upon the 
parametric values of a and /3. 
To sum up, we endogenize tariff policy in this Chapter by making 
endowments random and examine the nature of optimal policy in a stochastic 
world with asset markets. The key points are that the first best policy 
calls for both export and import tariffs and the addition of asset markets 
need not be welfare improving when adequate policy instruments are not 
used. However, our discussion in this Chapter presupposes that government 
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policies that are announced are also pursued. We relax this assumption in 
the next Chapter and address the time consistency issues explicitly. 
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V. ENDOGENOUS TARIFFS AND TIME CONSISTENCY 
A. General Idea 
Although the debate over "rules versus discretion" has played a 
critical role in shaping the macroeconomic policies in the past decade, 
relatively little attention has been paid to this issue in the trade policy 
literature. Thus, in this chapter, we grant the government of the policy 
active country the discretionary power to alter the tariff levels once 
financial decisions are made and address the time consistency issues 
inherent in such a framework. First, a few words about time consistency 
seem appropriate. 
A policy is said to be time consistent if it is optimal at every point 
in time. Therefore, any policy rule, assuming precommitment to that rule 
is possible, is necessarily time consistent. On the other hand, the 
problem of inconsistency arises if the optimal policy evaluated today, is 
no longer optimal when reexamined at a later date. This is likely to be 
the case in an economy where there is a time lag between various decisions 
taken by the private sector." This is because once some decisions are 
taken by the private sector (say production or financial decision or both) 
z^It is important to emphasize here that although we deal with a 
static framework in the present study, the sequence in which decisions are 
made is important. Hence the time consistency issues remain germane. 
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based on the previously announced policy, the government usually has an 
incentive to revise its policy since its information set changes. If the 
government also has sufficiently discretionary power to do so, the pre-
announced policy is no longer "credible" or time consistent. However, 
repeated inconsistency cannot persist. Hence a time consistent solution 
soon emerges which not only requires that the ex post policy be chosen 
optimally but also that the agents' expectations (about the future 
government policy) be correct. 
Some recent studies (e.g., see Eaton and Grossman, 1985 or Staiger and 
Tabellini, 1987) discuss the time consistency issues in models in which 
tariffs are used as second best instruments to redistribute income from 
those with low marginal utility of income to those with high marginal 
utility of income. In contrast, Lapan (1988) and Maskin and Newberry 
(1990) address the time consistency issues inherent in the standard optimal 
tariff type argument. I will discuss these last two papers briefly, in an 
effort to relate the present research to the existing literature. 
Lapan (1988) uses a static framework. The main theme of his paper is 
that in a world where there is a time lag between production and 
consumption decisions, the government of the large domestic country always 
has an incentive to raise the import tariff level ex post. This is because 
the optimal import tariff rate equals the reciprocal of the foreign export 
price elasticity of supply and this export supply curve is less elastic ex 
post. Hence the ex ante optimal tariff is not a time consistent policy. A 
consistent equilibrium however leads to a sub-optimal outcome (compared to 
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the precommitment equilibrium) in the sense that all countries are worse 
off ex post. The foreign (domestic) producers, correctly anticipating a 
future tariff higher than the ex ante optimum, respond by reducing 
(increasing) production. As a result, there is little trade and 
specialization. One alternative is to supplement the time consistent 
tariff policy with a more credible policy instrument, such as a production 
tax on the domestic production of importable. By restricting domestic 
production and thereby encouraging foreign production, such a policy is 
likely to raise welfare in both countries and help the economies move 
towards the optimal outcome. 
In the same spirit, Maskin and Newberry (1990), investigate the 
dynamic inconsistency of optimal tariffs on oil, an exhaustible natural 
resource. The suppliers of oil decide on their current sale today based 
not only on the current oil prices but also on the predicted future oil 
prices which, in turn, depends on the future levels of the tariff imposed 
by the oil importing country. If the government of the importing country 
can irrevocably precommit to its announced time path of tariff, the so-
called "open loop strategy" (i.e., tariff assuming precommitment) is time 
consistent. But Maskin and Newberry argue, as does Lapan, that the optimal 
open loop strategy is dynamically inconsistent in the sense that the large 
importer of oil will always find it beneficial to change the time path of 
tariff in the midstream. How this time path is going to be changed will 
depend on the rate at which the importing country trades off current versus 
future oil in consumption. If the importing country places greater weight 
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on future consumption (say U.S.), its government may announce today an 
exceptionally low tariff for the future so as to induce the suppliers to 
sell then. However, once the future period comes, there Is nothing 
preventing it from raising the tariff levels and making the suppliers 
regret that they did not sell all their oil in the first period. 
Maskin and Newberry also demonstrate that the dynamically consistent 
solution leads to an inferior outcome compared to the open loop strategy 
and discuss in this context the role that the future contracts on oil can 
play in overcoming the dynamic inconsistency problem. In particular, when 
the importing country places greater weight on future consumption, one way 
out is to buy future contracts on oil today so as to convince the supplier 
that the large importer has no incentive to raise tariffs and lower the 
market price in the future period. And if the level of future contracts is 
wisely chosen by the importing country, the ex ante optimum solution can be 
replicated by the time consistent solution.2* 
In a perfect foresight world of Maskin and Newberry or Lapan, the 
number of future contracts are government administered and not market 
determined. There is no economic rationale behind holding these contracts 
and these are merely used as tautological devices by the policy active 
government to improve upon the time consistent solution. In contrast, in 
our stochastic environment, the risk averse individuals participate in 
financial markets primarily to insure against uncertain income streams and 
2^In an unpublished manuscript, Lapan (1988) also notes that under 
perfect foresight, the future contracts alter the time consistent 
equilibrium and can be used to achieve the ex ante optimum. 
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the optimal number of contracts is determined endogenously within the 
model.25 Moreover, in the presence of spot markets, there is a time lag 
between the financial and consumption decisions taken by agents. This 
clearly provides an incentive for the policy active government to alter the 
tariff levels, given the equilibrium level of financial contracts. In this 
backdrop, we feel that a new dimension can be added to the existing 
literature by examining how the market determined levels of financial 
contracts may alter the time consistent policy ex post. We pursue this 
issue by extending our present framework as follows. 
B. Extension-of Basic Model 
The simple structure as described in Chapter IV is used once again, 
i.e., only the home country is assumed policy active and a log utility 
function is used to represent the preferences. However, the home 
government, in this extended version, has the ability to revise tariff 
levels. In view of this, the sequence of decision-making gets modified as 
follows. 
Sequence of Decision Making 
(i) The home government announces its optimal state contingent tariff 
2®As indicated in Chapter III, we prefer using contingent financial 
contracts as opposed to future contracts, since the former implies a less 
restrictive payoff structure. 
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policy, given the expectations about the future endowment levels; 
(ii) the representative agent in each country takes asset decisions based 
on their expectations about the revised tariff policy, regardless of 
government announcements ; 
(iii) uncertainty is resolved and actual endowment levels and their prices 
are realized; 
(iv) tariff decisions are taken ex post by the home government, given the 
asset positions of the agents; 
(v) actual consumption decisions are made based on the revised tariff 
levels. 
Intuitively speaking, we can think of this sequential decision-making 
process as a "strategic" interaction between the policy active government 
and the private agents in both countries. At every stage, while choosing 
its optimal strategy, each player assumes that the other will act in its 
own best interests in the subsequent stages. In solving such a sequential 
"game", it is only important to know when the last opportunity occurs to 
announce the optimal level of a strategy variable, since it is the last 
opportunity which carries irreversibility with it. In this sense, the 
previously announced optimal tariff at step (i) is strategically 
irrelevant, although technically feasible. 
It is instructive to note here that the policy active government is 
indifferent ex post between choosing an export tariff, an import tariff or 
any combination thereof. To put it differently, it is only the effective 
protection rate that matters for time consistent solution at step (iv). 
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This is because after uncertainty is resolved, the standard deterministic 
framework prevails and Lerner's symmetry holds. However, the agents asset 
decisions are still sensitive to the composition of tariffs as already 
explained in Chapter III. This, in turn, implies that the agents take 
their financial decision, in this extended framework, based upon their 
perception of the composition of government policy. Thus, the tariff 
structure matters for time consistent solution as well. 
Implicit in the above mentioned sequence of decision making is the 
notion that the government can precommit to the use of a particular tax 
instrument (i.e., an ad valorem tariff policy in our case), though not to 
the particular level of this instrument. This can be rationalized on the 
ground that any change in the nature of tax instruments is likely to be 
costlier than a mere change in the levels of tax instrument currently in 
use. This, in turn, also raises the point that in general it is costly to 
change even the levels of existing policy instruments. These are real 
costs, ranging from the administrative costs of changing the paperwork to 
the punishment costs for violating the terms of international treaties like 
GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade). Hence policy credibility 
is a matter of degree in the real world and is usually determined by the 
cost of making policy changes. In the present study, we abstain from these 
issues concerning the role of policy adjustment costs in time consistency 




Assuming that agents take the expected tariff policy into account in 
deciding their asset position, and that their expectations are correct, 
imply that it is possible to optimize backwards. Hence the backward 
optimization technique as outlined in Appendix G is used once again. First 
the optimal income and price equations are obtained in step (v), given the 
optimal effective protection rate ex post as well as the optimal asset 
positions. Next the time consistent policy is obtained at step (iv), given 
the optimal asset positions, on maximizing the realized utility of the 
domestic agent and substituting the optimal income and price equations from 
step (v). The asset decisions, on the other hand, are made ex ante at step 
(ii) following the optimization process outlined in chapter III. The 
difficult task remains in substituting the solution values obtained at 
steps (v) and (ii) back into step (iv) so as to obtain the reduced form 
equations for time consistent tariffs. 
C. The Role of Financial Structure 
From the outline of the solution procedure, it becomes clear that the 
financial structure is likely to play an important role in determining the 
time consistent policy ex post. In other words, how the government is 
going to set its policy later will depend on whether financial contracts on 
the export good or the import good or any combination of these goods are 
used. Thus, there will be an infinite set of time consistent solutions. 
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one for each financial structure. This feature of time consistent solution 
marks a significant departure from the precommitment solution where the 
composition of asset income does not matter. 
Let W and Z denote the number of contingent contracts bought (or sold) 
on good C and F respectively. Each costs (pays) the buyer (seller) 6^ and 
units, respectively, of good C in the offshore market^? in all the 
states for each unit of these contracts. Then the aggregate domestic real 
asset income, A, (measured in units of C) is expressed as 
The corresponding asset budget constraint (analogous to equation (3.5)) is 
given by 
From equation (5.1), it follows that if only contracts on C are used, i.e.. 
(5.1) 
Z.-O V s; 
ÇW = 0 (5.2) 
whereas if contracts on F are used, i.e., Wg-0 V s ; 
^®Note that arbitrage requires Pa-fdi,/#,) 
^^In this simplified setup where the foreign country is policy 
inactive, th^s is analogous to having settlement take place on the foreign 
soil; i.e., p, " Ps V s. 
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Ç<l'i2^i = 0 (5.3) 
Next we solve the present model under alternative financial structure, 
Essentially two types of financial structure are used. In the first case, 
the agents of both countries are allowed to trade only in financial 
contracts on the home export good C while in the second case, they trade 
only in contracts on the home import good F. On combining steps (iv) and 
(v) of the decision-making sequence, the time consistent tariffs are 
obtained as functions of endowment shares and financial contracts as 
follows. 
When financial contracts on C are used: the optimal tariff ex post in 
any state s is given by 









where the superscript c refers to the time consistent level of tariffs. 
Comparing equations (5.4) and (5.5) above with (4.4), the optimal level of 
precommitment tariffs under regime I without asset markets, it becomes 
clear that if the equilibrium levels of contracts are zero (as would be the 
case if endowment shares are such that there is no gain from inter-state 
trade), the time consistent solution will coincide with precommitment 
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solution. 




£>0 = m, = xj = /gd-Y,) + (5.6a) 
J Xg 
Equation (5.6) indicates that depending on the agents' perception about the 
tariff structure to be used, the asset demands will vary. 
A closer inspection of equations (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) reveals that 
in general it will be hard to obtain reduced form equations for time 
consistent tariffs, under either financial structure. However, by imposing 
additional structure on the model, we can generate some interesting 
predictions, even without actually solving the model. 
Suppose the agents trade in contracts on C and they expect the 
government to impose import tariffs only. On setting qg-T,, 7,-0 and 
combining equations (5.2),(5.4),(5.6) as well as the optimal income and 
price equations obtained at step (v) (not shown here); the reduced form 







^0 = r (5.7a) 
From equations (5.7) and (5.7a), it is clear that the optimal import 
tariffs imposed by the home government ex post in any state s depends on 
its mean shares in the world endowment of its exportable and importable 
good (a®,y8®), the home share of importable in that particular state (/Sj,) as 
well as the distribution of shares of importable across states . 
Such a solution has two interesting features. First, the time 
consistent tariffs will be the same between any two states s and j as long 
as the home shares of importable are the same in these states. Second and 
more interesting, given y9, the time consistent import tariff vector will 
be the same regardless of the distribution of export shares, as long as a® 
remains the same across alternative distributions of endowment shares. 
From these two features, it then follows that if the distribution of /8 is 
such that V s, the ex ante optimum tariff is also time consistent. 
This can be verified on substituting into equations (5.7) and 
(5.7a) and noting that on simplification, (5.7) reduces to equation (4.12) 
(evaluated at the mean shares). Hence we have the following proposition; 
Proposition 5.1; When financial contracts on the home export good are used 
and agents expect the home government to impose import tariffs, the ex ante 
optimum tariff is also time consistent regardless of the distribution of 
home shares in the world endowment of its exportable, provided that the 
home country's share in the total world endowment of its import good is 
invariant across states. 
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As it turns out, a similar conclusion can be derived when the agents 
trade in financial contracts on F and expect the government to impose 
export tariffs ex post. To see this clearly, we proceed as before and 
obtain the reduced form equation for time consistent export tariffs (on 
combining (5.3),(5.5),(5.6) and the optimal income and price equations at 
step V) as follows. 
(1-YS) = 
l+a,-2A 





Do = (5.8a) 
(1-Yi) 
As before, close inspection of (5.8) and (5.8a) reveals that the 
optimum export tariffs in any state s depends on and a. If the 
home country's share in the world endowment of its exportable remains the 
same across states, the time consistent export tariffs also remain 
invariant across states. Moreover, if a, "«j-a® V s, the ex ante export 
tariffs are also time consistent irrespective of the distribution of yS. 
Hence Proposition 5.2: 
91 
Proposition 5.2: If financial contracts on the home Import good F are used 
and agents expect the home government to use export tariffs, the ex ante 
optimum tariff is also time consistent; regardless of the distribution of 
its shares in the world endowment of its Importable, provided that the home 
country's share in the world endowment of its export good always remains at 
its mean level. 
It is worth emphasizing here that these conclusions are sensitive to 
the simple log utility function used and need not generalize to any 
functional form. Nevertheless, these results clearly demonstrate the 
crucial role that financial structure plays in influencing the time 
consistent policy ex post. Moreover, these results also suggest that for 
certain combinations of endowment shares, the optimal (market determined) 
levels of financial contracts can sustain the precommitment solution as 
time consistent. 
D. Simulation Results 
Failing to obtain analytical solutions for time consistent tariffs, we 
resort to simulation methods once again. The Newton updating formula (as 
described in Appendix D) is used to improve upon the initial guess. To 
provide comparisons with precommitment tariffs (as obtained in Chapter IV), 
the same combinations of endowment shares are considered for a two state 
world and the agents are assumed to trade only in financial contracts on 
^®It turns out that the optimal export (import) tariffs when financial 
contracts on home export (import) good used, in general, depend on the 
distribution of both a and p. Thus, it becomes difficult to obtain reduced 
form equations for time consistent tariffs in these cases. 
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good C.29 
For the sake of completeness, an additional policy regime is used and 
the regimes are redefined as follows. Under regime I. the home government 
uses only import (or equivalently export) tariffs as before in the absence 
of financial markets. Under regime II. it imposes only import tariffs with 
asset markets, the S-D case. We redefine regime III as the scenario where 
the home government uses only export tariffs in the presence of asset 
markets. Finally, regime IV depicts the situation where the government 
uses both export and import tariffs in some arbitrary combination, given 
the asset markets, i.e., 7-kr (say) and we set k-1. 
The simulation results are presented in Table 5.1 below. A careful 
examination of these results reveal some interesting features. 
1. Case (1) depicts a scenario where there is no role for asset markets 
since both endowment shares are the same across states. In the absence of 
asset trade, there is no real difference between ex ante optimum and ex 
post optimum tariffs. Hence, the optimal precommitment and time consistent 
tariffs and the associated welfare levels are always the same under regimes 
II, III and IV. Further, the optimal policies with asset markets are also 
identical to those without these markets, in the absence of any scope for 
inter-state trade. 
2. The expected welfare levels with precommitment policies are always at 
least as high as those with time-consistent policies, for each regime. 
^®It is important to note here that the simulation results in this 
chapter are limited in scope since alternative financial structures are not 
considered. 
Table 5.1 Comparison of precommitment and time consistent solutions 
Case «0 «1 /So Pi Policy I Policy II Policy II 
(precommit) (time consist) 
(1) 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 rjo-r; 1-0.5457 f;o'"'?i=0.5457 • 5457 
EV* - 1.8613 EV* = 1.8613 EV* = 1.8613 
(2) 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 rjo — 0.6315 ro~i7o""0.6167 To—jjo—O . 6837 
rii — 0.4226 ^ - 4327 fi"9r"0.3473 
EV* - 1.8495 EV* - 1.8684 EV* - 1.8632 
(3) 0.62 0.98 0.3 0.3 »7o - 0.3400 ro-r;o-0.5457 Tq-VO-O. 5457 
7)1 — 0.8630 fji—0. 5457 TJ—f;i—0.5457 
EV* - 1.8814 EV* - 1.8613 EV* - 1.8613 
(4) 0.62 0.98 0.1 0.5 »?o " 0.4646 ro~'7o~0.6167 ro"»;o"0.6837 
rii — 0.8259 ri-r/i—0.4327 ri"%i"0'3473 
EV* - 1.8152 EV* - 1.8684 EV* - 1.8632 
NOTES: This simulation assumes C^o-6,C^i-8,F^o-4,F^i-5,iTg-^ri-0. 5. 
EV* refers to the maximum expected utility under each regime. 





EV* - 1.8613 
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EV* - 1.9183 
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EV* - 1.8613 
7o"'/o~0- 7439 
7i"'7i"0-1253 
EV* - 1.8287 
7o'"?o'"0.4604 
7i-'>7i-0. 7152 








EV* - 1.8613 
^o"7o~0•3922 
T^—7i—0.2366 
t)q — 0.6306 
T}i - 0.4173 
EV* - 1.8654 
ro-7o-0.1950 
f1-71-0.5170 
riQ - 0.3520 
f7l - 0.7667 
EV* - 1.8795 
^o"7o~0•2696 
T1-71-0.4364 
fjo - 0.4664 
rji — 0.6824 






EV* - 1.8613 
To-7o-0.4630 
r1-71-0.1485 
fjo - 0.7117 
»ji - 0,2750 
EV* - 1,8588 
^o~7o~0•2973 
ri-7i-0.3732 
f7o - 0.5062 
fji - 0.6071 
EV* - 1.8703 
ro-7o-0'4199 
f1=71-0.1640 
i;o - 0.6635 
tjx - 0.3011 
EV* - 1,8350 EV* - 1.8077 
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This need not be the case in general since we are comparing two second best 
policies under every regime. It is important to emphasize here that the 
precommitment policy, in our construction, always represents a second best 
situation due to the lack of adequate policy instruments. In contrast, the 
optimal policy ex post involves time consistency issues and is therefore 
second best. It is conceivable that a time consistent policy may lead to 
higher expected welfare than the corresponding precommitment policy in our 
setup for different combinations of endowment shares. 
3. Only for the third case, the precommited import tariff policy is also 
time consistent and the associated expected welfare levels are the same. 
This directly follows from Proposition 5.1 above. 
4. It is instructive to look at the optimal solutions under regime III 
since the time consistent export tariff (when financial contracts on C are 
used) depends on the entire distribution of the home country's share in the 
world endowment of its exportable and importable. Comparing the optimal 
solutions under regime III with those for regime I, it turns out that when 
the government has the ability to alter export tariffs, it is worse off 
with the introduction of asset markets under cases (2) and (4), although 
there clearly remains potential gains from trading in these markets. This 
result is especially intriguing in view of the fact that the precommited 
export tariffs always lead to higher expected welfare when asset markets 
are explicitly introduced. 
We close our discussion by recalling our main finding in this Chapter; 
i.e., the financial structure plays an important role in influencing the 
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time consistent policy ex post. To put it differently, the composition of 
asset income also matters for time consistent solution. Furthermore, for 
specific combination of endowment shares, the endogenously determined 
levels of financial contracts can sustain the ex ante solution as time 
consistent, However, the simulation results are limited in scope since 
alternative financial structures are not considered and should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
An attempt is made in the present study to analyze the impact of 
financial markets for trade policy under conditions of uncertainty. This 
is a relatively new area of research and has gained considerable importance 
lately due to the rapid development and growing integration of financial 
markets in recent years. When the agents encounter the possibility that a 
policy change may occur, they have incentives to insure the policy risks 
they face. The availability of financial markets explicitly provide these 
risk sharing opportunities by permitting agents to transfer resources over 
time as well as across states of nature. Consequently, the opportunities 
to trade in these markets can completely change the effects of government 
policies. 
A fascinating illustration is provided by Stockman and Delias (1986) 
where they have shown that when government's import tariffs are random and 
agents trade in contingent commodity claims, a large country is better off 
in realized utility sense when the foreign country imposes tariff than if 
it does. We build upon and extend Stockman-Delias type of framework in the 
present study to examine the role of tariff structure and the nature of 
optimal policy in a stochastic framework with asset markets. Further, we 
address the time consistency issues that arise when the governments cannot 
commit to their previously announced policies and in this context, examine 
the role that the financial structure plays in influencing time consistent 
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tariffs. 
After introducing the topic and reviewing the literature in Chapter I 
and sketching an outline of Stockman-Delias framework in Chapter II, we 
develop our own theoretical model in Chapter III. The two most 
distinguishing features of our model are that governments of both home and 
foreign country use a combination of random export and import tariffs and 
agents trade in financial contracts, with the provision of spot trading in 
consumption goods. A log utility function is used to represent the 
preferences of the agents. The main results of Chapter III suggest that: 
(i) the structure of commercial policy (i.e., import or export tariffs) 
matters, so that Lerner's symmetry theorem does not extend to a stochastic 
framework with asset markets; (ii) the Stockman-Delias conclusions that the 
home country's realized utility is higher in those states where its own 
import tariff is zero (and the foreign import tariff is positive) do not 
hold when export tariffs are used; (iii) in general, it is optimal to use 
both import and export tariffs in such a framework. Some comparative 
static results are also provided which indicate how consumption levels vary 
across states in response to changes in export or import tariffs. Finally 
we point out that tariff structures will generally matter for production 
decisions as well. 
In Chapter IV, we endopenize tariff policy by assuming that endowments 
are random and tariffs are chosen optimally. Here we compare the values of 
optimal policies across states within any regime as well as optimal 
policies across regimes. The comparison of optimal policies across states 
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reveals that whether the export (import) tariff in any state is higher or 
lower than that in any other state depends only on the policy active 
country's share in the world endowment of the exportable (importable), 
although the complete solution depends on the shares of both the goods in 
all the states in the presence of asset markets. To compare optimal 
policies across regimes, simulation method is used. Our simulation results 
indicate that the expected welfare when both export and import tariffs are 
used is at least as high as that when only import tariffs are used, with or 
without asset markets. However, if commercial policy is restricted to 
import tariffs, the introduction of asset markets can be welfare 
deteriorating, even though there remains potential gains from engaging in 
inter-state trade. 
In Chapter V, we outline the potential time consistency issues 
inherent in such a framework. With the provision of spot trading in 
consumption, the policy active government usually has an incentive to 
revise tariff policy after financial decisions are made and this has real 
effects. Using simulation results, we show that the tariff structure 
matters for time consistent solution as well, since agents asset decisions 
are sensitive to their perception of the composition of government policy. 
More interesting, the financial structure plays a critical role in 
determining the time consistent policy ex post. In particular, we 
demonstrate that if agents trade in financial contracts on the home 
exportable (importable), the ex ante optimum import (export) tariff is also 
time consistent, provided the home country's shares in the world endowment 
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of its importable (exportable) remains invariant across states. Finally, 
our simulation results also indicate that the precommitment policy always 
gives rise to at least as high expected utility as time consistent policy, 
when financial contracts on C are used. However, this need not be the case 
always, since both the policies are perceived second best in the present 
setup. 
A. Extensions 
An obvious extension of the present research would be to incorporate 
production decisions explicitly and analyze time consistency issues once 
again. As Lapan (1988) pointed out, time consistency issues seem germane 
even in a deterministic world where there is a time lag between production 
and consumption decisions. Thus, it is worth.exploring how our results 
will change in a production economy with asset markets, where both the 
production and asset decisions are taken before uncertainty is resolved and 
government cannot precommit its commercial policy. 
Also we have not included the policy adjustment costs in analyzing 
time consistency issues. In practice, policy credibility is a matter of 
degree rather than something that exists or not. The degree of such 
credibility is determined by the cost of making policy changes. It is 
conceivable that whether or not the government revises its policy ex post 
will depend on the benefits from revised tariffs net of cost of changing 
tariffs vis-a-vis benefits from ex ante tariffs. In view of this, another 
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possible extension of present research can proceed by examining the role 
that policy adjustment costs can play in alleviating the time consistency 
problems. 
Finally, we have assumed complete asset markets throughout the present 
study despite the fact that in real world, some insurance market or other 
is usually missing. The incompleteness of financial markets can be due to 
imperfect information like "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" or this 
can be attributed to various forms of government restrictions still 
prevailing in these markets. Hence another interesting extension of the 
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APPENDIX A 
Let M denote the number of futures contracts on good F. By 
convention, M>0 indicates that the domestic agents are net buyers of future 
contracts. As with financial contracts, the settlement of futures 
contracts is assumed to take place in the offshore market. Let p^, indicate 
the predetermined (offshore) relative price of F as specified in the 
futures contract. 
The representative agent in the home country chooses the optimal 
number of futures contracts by solving the following optimization problem: 
subject to 
Jp = ~ (A.l) 
<1 - Yi) 
The income equation of the domestic agent is derived using the same logic 
as before in the case of financial contracts. 






-  PJ (1 -  Xi) (A. 2) 
Further, given the representative agent assumption, futures market 
equilibrium requires 
where M* and M* denote the optimal aggregate holdings of futures contracts 
in home and foreign country respectively. Equation (A.3) determines p^. 
Let A^*(Â***) and be the optimal solutions in the home (foreign) 
country with state contingent financial contracts and futures contracts 
respectively. Comparing the optimal income equation (A.l) with (3.9), it 
becomes clear that the return from holding financial contracts can be 
replicated by futures contracts if 
or equivalently, 
M"" Wi - PJ = Vi 
using asset market equilibrium conditions (3.15) and (A.3) respectively. 
Further, substituting (A.4) into asset budget constraint (3.5) and 
simplifying. 
M* + M* = 0 (A.3) 
- P„) = Vi (A.4) 
Ç 0 A = (A.5) 
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which, in turn, determines 
When there are two states, there is only one Independent equation in 
M* on combining (A.4) and (A.5) and summing over h. Hence M* can be 
uniquely determined and contingent payment pattern is replicated. However, 
for more than two states, M* is uniquely determined only if 
^ Vs#j (A.6) 
A 
This, in turn, requires that k*^ be linear in p^. 
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APPENDIX B 
Given the same intra-state effective protection across regimes (ri\ -
qlg, r)^\ - V s), the consumption allocation for each state will be the 
same for the two regimes if, and only if, net asset trades for each state 
are the same for the two regimes (A^ = A^s, - A^g V s). Supporting 
this solution requires that (i) (internal and world) relative commodity 
prices for each state be equal across regimes; (ii) internal (home and 
foreign) relative inter-state asset prices be the same across regimes; and 
(iii) that the net value of asset trades, evaluated at world prices, be 
equal (to zero) for both regimes. It does not necessarilv require world 
asset prices for each state to be equal across regimes. Define: 
and (X^a. A's) is defined symmetrically. By definition, fii (-pi) • 1. Also 
define: 
In (B.2), is the world relative price of A, (compared to Ai) under 
regime i. From the FOCs determining optimal asset positions ( (3.13) and 
(3.14) ), preserving internal relative asset prices implies: 
x" 1 = 1, I I :  p, = - ^  (B.l) 
a i  = (ei /  Q i )  :  i  =J, I I !  a i  •  1  (B.2) 
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(al/ai^) = K. = F, Vs (B.3) 
Finally, the asset budget constraint (3.5) implies: 
(B.4) 
S s g 
(where no regime superscripts appears on the A, under the assumption of 
identical allocations). 
Clearly, if - 1 V s, the two regimes are functionally 
equivalent, so Lerner's symmetry theorem (as modified) holds. If * 1 
for some s, then for arbitrary /i,, the two regimes will yield different 
outcomes. However, it is possible (though a singularity) for (B.4) to hold 
even if /i, (- /;,) is not identically equal to 1 (provided there are more 
than two states). Intuitively, if the /i, (-Ms) vector is chosen to 
preserve domestic internal asset prices and the net value of asset trades 
(at world asset prices), the resulting allocation will be unaltered even 
though world asset prices change. 
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APPENDIX C 
In the second stage, Income and price equations are obtained, given 
the asset position, as follows. Substituting the consumption demand for 
good C from (3.23) into the goods market equilibrium condition (3.16) and 
using the income definitions (3.11) and (3.12) (summed over all agents), 
balance of trade condition (3.7), the arbitrage relation (3.3) and finally 
noting that M - X ; the equilibrium spot relative price in the foreign 
market is solved as follows. 
- _ - (p-4,) (i-K,) (i-n.) (c. n 
Substituting p, in (3.11) and (3.12) (summed over agents) and once again 
recalling arbitrage relation (3.3), the income equations (in terms of Ag)^ 
are then obtained as 
_ 2 (c 2) 
- _ 2(1-Tf,)(l+J,) + 2|i(A,-l+ns) (C. 
The home and foreign aggregate asset demands are obtained in the first 
stage on solving the optimization problems as outlined in the text and 
summing over agents. This, in turn, yields 




Then asset market equilibrium condition (15) implies 
where 
X, = 1,(1-7,) ; X, = ; Xf = X,+3f, (c.6a) 
Substituting (C.6) back into (C.4) and (C.5), the reduced form asset 
demands are obtained as 
At - •*/ Ç - Lg ( C. 7 ) 
â; = x/ç 
Rj&j — 
xi 
where, by our construct. 
R (C.8) 
- T - — _ vl" Z/. = y. (I-Y.) ; z.. = ; Ll • L,*L, = Xi 
It then follows from (C.8) that 
Çjtjii-O (C.9) 
J Xj 
Let us define Dg - X^/X^ which can be shown to be invariant across states. 
Substituting (C.6a), (C.2) and (C.3) in Dq, A ^  can be expressed in terras of 
Do which, in turn, is plugged into (C.l) through (C.3) to obtain equations 
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25), (3.26), (3.27). Finally, (C.9) Is used to solve for Dq 
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APPENDIX D 
Let Y - f(x) be a non-linear function of x. To find the roots of the 
equation f(x) - 0, we proceed as follows. Let x - x^ be some initial guess 
value of X. Then the successive approximations of x are obtained as 
using the Newton-Raphson formula, where f'(x) denotes the first derivative 
of f(x) with respect to x. If these iterations produce approximations that 
approach the solution more and more closely at every step, the iterative 
method is said to converge. 
The Newton-Raphson formula may be derived analytically using the 
following Taylor series approximation of the function f(x). 
f= flXi+h) = f+ hf'(Xi) + + . . . =0 
Neglecting all terms of second and higher degree in h and simplifying, 
This method can be easily extended to a two variable case. 
Graphically, the Newton-Raphson updating formula implies that the 
initial guess value (x^) is updated by that point where the slope of the 
tangent to the curve y - f(x) at Xi intersects the x-axis and this process 
is repeated until convergence. 
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As it turns out, the Newton method is very sensitive to the choice of 
initial guess. If the initial guess is not near the root, it may lead to 
an endless cycle. In the present study, the initial guesses are always 
provided using the grid search technique. We evaluate the objective 
function (underlying the first order condition, f(x)-O) at equally spaced 
points over the entire range of x and choose that x for which the objective 
function is at its maximum. 
